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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Tort Reform Symposium reproduced in this issue of the Nevada Law
Journal reflects provocative analysis of the issues by distinguished analysts.
Symposium commentary has been substantive and civil - no easy matter when
addressing a topic that has become popularized in a type of "sound bit du jour"
manner over the past months and where emotions and perceived financial
stakes run high. The Symposium featured a day of reflection (and of course
some argumentation and advocacy) by reasonable people with expertise in the
field.' Similar events have dotted the landscape of law reform debate since at
least the "first" tort reform "crisis," the medical malpractice insurability imbroglio of the 1970s. We are now in what might be termed the third tort reform
movement of modem times (the second being the very hard insurance market,
especially for product liability insurance, during the mid-1980s).2
As Professor Michael Green's comments trenchantly remind us, all of this
has a familiar ring: insurers and tort defendants claim unfairly escalating liability, plaintiffs' lawyers and consumer groups counterattack, and (for the most
part), insurers and defendants obtain some of the relief they seek. The tort
reform victories are not so overwhelming as to completely unravel the historical rights of victims or the power of courts generally, but some constriction of
rights inevitably occurs. During periods of quiescence, plaintiffs and consumers take back some lost territory through common law victories expanding
claimant rights, or through specific legislation. Statutes that permitted states to
sue tobacco companies for state-paid health care costs during the 1990s are an
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). Special thanks to Dmitri Shalin and the UNLV Center for

Democratic Culture for creating this tort reform symposium and to Dean Richard Morgan for
his strong support of the Symposium and similar efforts at the university and law school.
Thanks also to Boyd Law faculty, students, and participants, particularly long-distance
travelers Professor Michael Green and Nancy Udell.
' See Symposium, Justice and Democracy Forum: The Law and Politics of Tort Reform, 4
NEV. L.J. at 377 (2003) [hereinafter Symposium].
2 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 422 (remarks of Michael Green).
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example.3 Arguably, Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 40, which governs
claims for defective construction, is another example.4
But plaintiffs and consumers during the past thirty years have probably not

been net gainers relative to inflation and population growth. While plaintiffs
may have won some doctrinal victories, defendants have had no shortage of the
same. In fact, this particular time period contained what Professors Theodore
Eisenberg and James Henderson call the "quiet revolution" in product liability
claims, leading to common law doctrine and adjudication favorable to defendants.5 It was also an era of civil procedure rule "reform" that systematically
favored defendants. 6 Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court also weighed in on
behalf of defendants and insurers, making it easier for defendants to get sum-

3 See Symposium, The Florida Tobacco Litigation, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (1998)

(reviewing and assessing one state's legislation, litigation, and large settlement with tobacco
manufacturers for injuries and attendant health care costs allegedly caused by tobacco
products).
4 See 2003 Nev. Stat. 362 (establishing the regime for making construction defect claims,
including mandatory mediation and recovery of counsel fees for claimants). During the
2003 Session of the Nevada Legislature, contractors were successful in obtaining some of
the amendments they sought to Chapter 40, primarily the express provision of a defendant's
right to inspect and repair allegedly defective construction. See Sharon A. Steen, SB 241:

Changes in Construction Defect Law,

COMMUNIQUE,

Aug. 2003, at 14.

' See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., The "Quiet Revolution" in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990); Theodore
Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39
UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992). Subsequently, Professor Henderson and Brooklyn Law School
Professor Aaron Twerski, two noted critics of product liability decisions seen as too
favorable to plaintiffs, served as Reporters for the American Law Institute's revision of Sec-

tion 402A of the

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

(2002). The resulting version of Section

402A (including Illustrations and the Reporter's Note) is generally regarded as more
favorable to defendants than its predecessor.
6 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 51 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001) (examining activity surrounding the 2000 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and finding the process substantially captured by
defense interests, particularly those of product liability defendants); Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Give the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L.
REV. 229 (1999) (concluding that the direction of federal civil litigation generally, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amendments in particular, have favored defendants); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, ContractingAccess to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIz. L.
REv. 965 (1998) (concluding that a variety of changes during the 1970-1997 period effectively reduced claimant access to courts with negative social effects); Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (concluding that discovery is neither as excessive or problematic as suggested by interested groups urging
contraction of discovery); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construction? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 659 (1993) (tracing the history of civil litigation and finding an ongoing battle
between those favoring more open courts and those favoring greater restriction, with the
latter group coming into dominance); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:The Supreme
Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
Process, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (reviewing the Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy and finding that it makes substantial change in summary judgment practice
designed to provide more frequent pretrial dismissal of many claims).
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mary judgment,7 harder for plaintiffs to introduce expert testimony in their
cases, 8 and dramatically limiting punitive damages as a matter of a constitutional right.9

If keeping a scorecard, one would be hard-pressed not to conclude that
defendants have been the overall winners in both the chronic and episodic tort
reform battles of the past thirty years.1 0 Yet, neither have they been able to
deliver a knockout punch - though not for want of trying. The legal, political,
social, economic, and rhetorical battle over tort reform continues. Compromise
resolves most of the issues for a time, but final consensus remains elusive.
Why have these and similar explorations of tort litigation failed to produce
greater consensus? Why does the issue of tort reform continue to be so divisive
and the divisions so repetitive (the "deja vu all over again" noted by social
critics Yogi Berra and Mike Green)?
In my view, the disagreements are chronic, recurring, and intractable for a
number of reasons that are - not surprisingly - similarly chronic, recurring, and
intractable. Fortunately, however, the social forces at war over the tort system
are also sufficiently balanced, such that neither side is likely to gain a clear
upper hand capable of imposing its will on the rest of society (although the

I

See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L.
REV. 203 (1993); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 95 (1988). Some of the Court's decisions on proof at trial have also proven unduly
helpful to civil litigation defendants in the hands of the lower courts. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in
Employment DiscriminationCases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
8 See David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's
Philosophy of Science, 68 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2003) (reviewing the Supreme Court's 1993
Daubert opinion and its progeny creating greater barriers to the introduction of expert
testmony); Eric Berkman, 10 Years After "Daubert": Landmark Case Has Been Bad News
for Plaintiffs, LAW. WKLY. USA, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1 (quoting Federal Judicial Center senior
research associate Joe Cecil that there is among analysts a "consensus that plaintiffs have a
greater burden than they did before Daubert" and quoting Southwestern University Law
Professor Myrna Raeder that "Since Daubert, the number of summary judgments issued in
civil cases has skyrocketed.").
9 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that
the Due Process clause of the Constitution requires courts to regulate the size of punitive
damage awards and suggesting that even in cases of reprehensible defendant conduct, punitive damage awards should not ordinarily be more than a single-digit multiple of the amount
of compensatory damages awarded. This is a major shift from prior United States Supreme
Court precedent and traditional state willingness to allow multiples in the 30-40 times compensatory damage range). See also Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781
N.E.2d 121 (2002) (also expressing reservations about punitive damages, remitting a $30
million award to $19 million, and requiring that portion of the award be given to charity
rather than pocketed by plaintiff).
10 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119 (2002) (empirical study of appellate cases suggests plaintiffs do not enjoy a disproportionate victory); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
947, 947 (concluding that "defendants have a substantial advantage over plaintiffs on
appeal" and this advantage is greater in tort actions than commercial claims); Susan Massmann, Courts Inclined to Overturn Unreasonable Jury Awards, CLAIMS, Mar. 2003, at 23.
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defendant community will probably continue to win somewhat more than the
plaintiff community in the foreseeable future). This is the coexistence to which
I refer in the title.of this Comment. It is not particularly peaceful, but it is a
relatively nonviolent and contained coexistence. Unfortunately, the situation is
unlikely to fundamentally change any time soon. However, there are some
areas of common ground that hold promise for effecting an operational compromise, even if ideological or social consensus remains an elusive target.
There are numerous reasons for social division on this issue. Various
sides of the tort reform debate ground their ideology based on radically different conceptions of reality, making meaningful dialogue difficult. Many participants in the debate have a view of the situation that is clouded by enormous
personal economic interests. The tort reform debate also has an element of
intractable-political-bogeyman class warfare, as consumers of modest means
(through their surrogates) square off against largely well-paid owners, investors, executives, and professionals. The sociological culture of the groups
involved also leads to a certain defensiveness, suspicion, and misunderstanding.
Furthermore, there is an inherent conflict among key legal concepts that makes
it difficult for even the most neutral observer to arrive at a sound, global, longterm "fix" for perceived problems of the litigation and dispute resolution
system.
This Comment assembles and assesses the primary factors producing this
"cultural cold war" of the law, particularly emphasizing factors of professional
culture and imbedded tension in legal policymaking, which, in my view, have
been under-emphasized by even the most discerning commentators in the area.
Although these factors have produced a sub-optimal situation that is unlikely to
change, there remain some attractive options for law reform that can satisfy the
various interest groups and society as a whole. But implementing these sorts of
changes will require serious shifts in thinking and behavior that may be too
difficult to accomplish.
II.

ANECDOTE-DRIVEN "ANALYSIS"

AND THE UTILITARIAN

POPULIST FALLACY

Tort reform proponents and opponents seem to live in two different
worlds, at least according to the stories they tell and the degree to which these
stories veer from reality. The classic quip about tensions in the Middle East
and Northern Ireland ("one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter")
could apply to the tort reform camps.
As an example, consider the now notorious McDonald's coffee case. As
presented by tort reform advocates, this is a tale of a careless driver who spilled
coffee on herself, unfairly blamed the coffee vendor, and then, due to the
absurdities of an out-of-control legal system, obtained a seven-figure payoff.
As Professor Rob Correales detailed in his Symposium presentation, there is
another, fuller side to the story much more favorable to the plaintiff. The vendor was not arguably at fault simply because it was a large corporation, but
because McDonalds chose to sell its coffee at a temperature much hotter than
that of many vendors, even while knowing that many of its patrons had been
scalded by coffee at that 180 degree temperature. The plaintiff did not suffer a
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nuisance injury, but rather sustained second and third degree burns to a sensitive area. Furthermore, the amount of the original award was set aside after
appeal, with the case settling for a significant (six-figure) award that, while
non-trivial, was hardly the lottery payoff portrayed by tort reform advocates.
As a consequence of this case, McDonald's both lowered the temperature of its
coffee and placed warnings on the cups."'
Viewed in its totality, the McDonald's coffee case does not seem like the
example of system failure originally trumpeted by the critics. To be sure, reasonable people can debate the underlying issues of assumption of risk, comparative fault, amount of compensation, and degree of defendant culpability. That,
of course, is my point. The debate proceeds within a zone of reasonable differences, which is hardly the mark of a broken system. The outcome in the
McDonald's coffee case may not be to everyone's liking, but, when fully
understood it is clearly not absurd. Arguably, it reflects a good system encouraging more responsible behavior by vendors.
The same can be said for the horror stories told by plaintiffs' counsel and
consumer groups of clamps left in stomachs during surgery, inebriated physicians, or buildings thrown up with cardboard and no fire walls (a real life construction defect nightmare as related by Bill Robinson). 2 The unfortunate
occurrence of these events does not mean that the medical or homebuilding
systems are corrupt or broken any more than the presence of controversial
plaintiff verdicts makes the legal system infirm. Neither does taking a less
emotional view of occasional wrongs mean that the victims of these wrongs
should have their relief limited on the basis of an ideological (but not factual)
belief that the legal system is "out of control." Some perspective is in order.
Both sides of the tort reform debate have engaged in unfortunate "broken
system" rhetoric that comes close to demagoguery in many instances.
Although I am trying to be fair (but am undoubtedly influenced by my own
training as a lawyer), it seems clear to me that tort reform advocates have
engaged in more of this than plaintiffs or consumers. University of Wisconsin
Law Professor Marc Galanter has made something of a sub-career of examining this debate and has concluded that there is more myth than reality in the
picture presented by many tort reformers.1 3 He has gone so far as to posit a
"turn against law" during this time period. A significant part of this anti-law
trend is fueled by the rhetoric, public relations, and lobbying efforts of the
defense community. 14
1 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 419 (remarks of Professor Rob Correales).
12 See id. at 382 (remarks of William J. Robinson).
13 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, "An Oil Strike in Hell": Contemporary Legends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The
Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENy. U. L. REv. 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, "The Day
After" the LitigationExplosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). Professor Galanter has
also argued convincingly that even punitive damages, a much maligned aspect of the law,
serves a useful social purpose. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive
Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993).
14 See Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002) (noting that although per capita litigation rates in America
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Like any effective public relations campaign, the tort reform movement's
efforts have some significant basis in reality, just not nearly as much as many
interest groups would have you believe. There are frivolous claims that slip
through the system and result in awards. Class action practice is a mess that
often benefits lawyers more than clients. Some venues are laughably favorable
to plaintiffs either because of jurors bent on income redistribution, judges
dependent on the largesse of the plaintiffs bar, or both. Some awards are too
high in relation to the harm done. Courts, forced to deal with individual15 cases,
are not particularly good at setting social policy on risk management.
But these admitted failings of the system do not mean that the system is
"broken" or in need of immediate radical repair any more than the recent East
Coast power outage means that the entire American energy system is a failure
or that a murder in Manhattan indicates a need for housecleaning in the NYPD.
Both sides of the Tort Reform debate, particularly the tort reformers, would be
doing all of us a favor by shelving the "sky is falling" rhetoric in favor of a
more restrained approach. For example, a good deal of the medical malpractice
reform rhetoric suggests that physicians are being held to ever-escalating standards of liability. 6 The actual adjudicatory track record is at least mixed and
arguably more favorable to physicians than those suing them.' 7
rose after 1960, the 1930-60 time period had the lowest litigation rates in history; current
litigation rates per capita are generally lower than those of the pre-1930 period). Again
bowing to whatever subconscious prejudices I have on this issue because I am a lawyer, I
cannot help but believe that some of this anti-law tide of the past quarter-century is a bad
thing for society and the nation. To trot out the perhaps shopworn quote from the story of
Sir Thomas More: "if you cut ... down" the laws "d'you really think you could stand
upright in the wind that would blow then?" See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS,

Act I 56, (Samuel French, Inc. 1966). This rhetorical question may be a little self-serving for
the profession, but it has a large grain of truth. Robust legal structures provide a level of
fair protection for all elements of society irrespective of popular political trends and social
attitudes. Ironically, the business components of the tort reform initiative realize this. They,
on the one hand, argue for "less law" where this is seen as beneficial to their cause (e.g.,
alternative dispute resolution; contraction of legal rights) but argue for "more law" when it is
to their advantage (changes in civil procedure rules, greater requirements for expert testimony, more judicial intervention regarding punitive damages and jury verdicts). A more
neutral approach on both sides would appreciate the wisdom attributed to Thomas More in
Bolt's once-popular play: "I'd give the Devil the benefit of the law, for my own safety's
sake." Id.
15 See generally Symposium, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil
Justice on the American Economy and Polity, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1537 (2002); See also Robert
G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 41 DuKE L.J.
1251 (2002) (proposing reforms to make class action results more merit-based); Laurens
Walker, A Model Plan to Resolve Federal Class Action Cases by Jury Trial, 88 VA. L. REV.
405 (2002) (proposing reforms to make fact-based class action resolution more frequent);
Mark A. Hofman, House OKs Class-Action Bill: Reform Backers Hopeful Senate will Follow
Suit, Bus. INs., June 23, 2003, at 1 (discussing congressional reservations about current class
action practice); Lawrence H. Mirel, Looking Out for Someone Else: Class Actions to Raid
Insurance Coffers Recklessly Undermine Expert Decisions of State Regulators, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at 44.
16 See, e.g., Joseph Montedonico & Mark H. Allenbaugh, Chasing Doctors Away: The District Must Reform Its Tort Law to Keep Physiciansfrom Running, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 4,
2003, at 60.
17 Compare Smith v. Parrott, 833 A.2d 843 (Vt. 2003) (rejecting as a matter of law medical
malpractice claim for "loss of chance" of survival), with McMackin v. Johnson County
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To some extent, this perception of the problem results both from sloppy
journalism by the national media and a trait of human psychology termed by
behavioral economists. People appear to overrate the risk of rare but highly
publicized events, in part, because these events become highly publicized due
to their rarity, or new value. An example is injury by shark attack or lightning
strike. When these tragedies occur they are sure to make the paper. As a
result, people are inordinately conscious of and concerned about these dangers
relative to far more mundane but more dangerous activities such as driving to
the grocery store. 8 Applied to the litigation context, this phenomenon results
when large jury awards are reported while appellate reversal, new trial grants,
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and defense verdicts are far less likely to
be reported. Over time, the popular perception becomes that plaintiffs are winning every darn malpractice suit. Yet, available evidence suggests not only that
defendants win, but that malpractice defendants do better than the average
defendant. Additionally, there are high transaction costs to making a medical
malpractice, construction defect, or product liability claim due to the need for
substantial discovery and expert testimony. If anything, this must pull potential
plaintiffs, at least modestly, in the direction of foregoing even valid claims.
But you would never know it from reading the paper. Alternatively, the resonating story of individual harm can lead to unfounded perceptions that medical
care is much worse and more dangerous than is actually the case.' 9
The "broken system" rhetoric frequently finds a home in Nevada on the
pages of the Las Vegas Review-Journal. Take, for example, the Review-Journal's account of the dismissal of the McDonald's obesity case (another
McDonald's case giving rise to tort reform anecdote). When reporting that the
court had dismissed a claim against McDonald's based on its sales of allegedly
Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094 (Wyo. 1993) (permitting a "loss of chance" claim to proceed).
See also Schmidt v. Mahoney, 659 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 2003) (allegation - rejected by the

Iowa Supreme Court - that a doctor's failure to properly treat a motorist "caused" his seizure
and bad driving that injured others).
18

See

LARRY LAUDAN, THE BOOK OF RISKS: FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT THE CHANCES WE

(1994); Jane Spencer & Cynthia Crossen, Fear Factors: Why Do Americans Feel that DangerLurks Everywhere? Fixation on Risk, Fed by Labs, Law and Media,
Haunts World's Safest Nation; 'Easier to Scare than Unscare,' WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2003,
at Al.
19 See Mary Alexander, The Human Face of the Medical Malpractice Debate, TRIAL, Apr.
2003, at 9 (noting the resonance of news accounts of death of seventeen-year old Jessica
Santillan, who died at Duke University Hospital due to transfusion of the wrong blood type).
Irrespective of the political uses to which Ms. Santillan's death may be put by lawyers or
politicians, I agree with Alexander and other plaintiffs' lawyers that the tragic episode makes
a powerful case against rigid damage caps. It also clearly illustrates how disastrous the
consequences of malpractice can be at even the best institutions. See also Barbara Pinson,
Shine the Light on Texas' Most Dangerous Doctors, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2003, at 19A
(discussing problem physicians, the author, herself an M.D., relates her personal experience
of being injured due to alleged misdiagnosis and mistreatment by surgeon with seventeen
prior lawsuits. "Our regulatory system failed to protect me from this dangerous doctor"; "As
an injured patient, I know the true measure of noneconomic damages - I face agony every
day that has disrupted my life in too many ways"); James W. Gustafson Jr. & Thomas D.
Masterson, Challenging Hospitalsthat Tolerate Incompetent Doctors, TRIAL, May 2003, at
18.
TAKE EVERY DAY
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unhealthy food, the Review-Journal breathed a figurative sigh of relief, observing that "finally," we had a decision by a "judge with common sense."20
Although no one (except perhaps political incumbents) likes a bland editorial page, neither do we need one that takes cheap shots with no factual basis.
The clear implication of the Review-Journal slant on the McDonald's fatty
food case is that courts, as a whole, lack common sense. This assertion is a bit
outrageous, even for a newspaper widely perceived as disliking lawyers,
judges, and legal institutions generally. Like many academics, I have invested
a good deal of my professional life being critical of judicial decisions and
actions where I thought criticism was deserved. I am probably as big a "judgebasher" as one can find on the UNLV faculty, or any faculty this side of the
1930s legal realists at Yale. Yet even I would never suggest that the bulk of the
bench lacks common sense or intelligence, competence, integrity, fairness, or a
strong work ethic. But to read popular accounts or the articles of some tort
reform proponents, one would think that judges and juries are airheads falling
all over themselves to give money for hokey claims. The best empirical data
assembled to date strongly suggests this is not the case. 2 1 At some point,
relentless rhetoric about "broken" systems may be effective short-term politics,
but it is not fair argumentation and probably has deleterious long-term consequences for the system and society.
Perhaps the most effective public relations effort by those advocating
medical malpractice reform has been to suggest that true medical malpractice
seldom occurs, and that juries often mistake the uncertainties of human health
for doctor error. In addition, this component of the tort reform lobby argues
that medical malpractice claims encourage wasteful defensive medicine rather
than useful deterrence of bad or risky practices. My own view is quite different. Although some of it is based on personal experience, available aggregate
data suggests that medical malpractice occurs with disturbing frequency. 22 Let
me address each of the posited myths in turn.
As to the first common claim of tort reformers, the notion that malpractice
is "over-claimed" rather than under-claimed, as the saying goes, you couldn't
prove it by me. I have had seven surgical procedures in my life: the routine
tonsillectomy of youth; four knee operations; surgery to set a badly broken
See Editorial, Fast Food Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 27, 2003, at 6B.
Although this is not to say there are not actual problems with the status quo and proposals
for reform worth considering. See, e.g., Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What if You
Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 235 (2003); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87
IOWA. L. REv. 909 (2002); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For:
Result-Based Compensationfor Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1427 (2001); Gary
20
21

S. Mogel, MalpracticeReforms Not A Cure-All, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 36.
See generally Symposium, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2002); Symposium, Health, Law & Human Rights: Exploring the Connections, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 490 (2002); Symposium, The Regulation of Managed Care Organizations and the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 527 (2001).

See, e.g., Rita Rubin, Patients' Care Often Deficient, Study Says: Proper Treatment
Given Half the Time, USA TODAY, June 26, 2003, at IA; Half of What Doctors Know Is
Wrong: An Issue Exploring Medicine and Its Myths, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2003;
Editorial, To Aid Med Mal Reform, Physicians, Heal Thyselves, Bus. INs., Feb. 17, 2003, at
22

8. See also supra notes 18-20.
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ankle (complete with titanium screw that remains in the ankle); and hip replacement. Despite making me an orthopedic disaster, all of this has left me with
considerable admiration for the American medical profession and its accomplishments. I have been impressed by the improvement of medical technology
applied to my maladies, from the surgery in 1974 that gave my left knee that
zippered "just missed the NFL" look to my 1993 arthroscopy that hardly left a
trace and permitted me to walk the next day.
But I have also seen considerable variance in the skill of doctors and support staff and have been subjected to what most reasonable people would
describe as negligence. My first knee surgeon probably did not adequately and
completely remove loose material in the joint, at least according to the assessment of my second knee surgeon. Undoubtedly, this grating of loose material
in the joint for three years was not therapeutic for the knee. But did I sue? Of
course not; my damages were comparatively minor, hard to prove, and I had
other things to do. But this is probably an instance of minor malpractice slipping through the cracks.
My third knee surgery involved spinal block anesthetic that left me with a
splitting headache, even though I strictly followed orders to refrain from sitting
up until the next day. I am pretty sure that a reasonable jury would conclude
the I had been dosed with too much novocaine in the spine. But did I sue? Of
course not. What are the damages for one headache, even a really bad headache that lasts for a day? And why would I want the hassle of litigation absent
compelling circumstances?
A far greater anesthesia problem occurred during my 1989 ankle surgery,
another spinal block that was, in my view, mishandled. Part way through the
procedure, despite being sedated, I could not help but notice that the surgical
team was becoming a bit agitated and was scrambling, seemingly worried.
When one of the nurses gasped "Oh god, his pulse is down to 12," that really
got what was left of my attention. Within seconds, one of the doctors was
pounding on my chest and throwing some adrenalin into my IV tube. After a
few tense minutes (maybe only seconds but seemed much longer), my heart
came back closer to normal and the procedure was completed.
After I was back in my hospital room, the anesthesiologist dropped by to
chat and engage in some damage control. This is, of course, figurative page six
from the implicit "how to minimize malpractice claims" manual taught to physicians: develop some sort of relationship with the patient so they are less likely
to sue. Although I am likely to be more immune to this type of charm offensive than most patients, it still is not a bad idea. I liked the doctor just fine and
appreciated the visit, but would have appreciated it more if he had been willing
to confess a little error. These things do not just happen. They happen when
the anesthesiologist fills your spine too high with too much novocaine that
begins to put the heart muscle to sleep. Fortunately, the situation was rectified
while I still had a pulse.
Months later, a doctor friend practicing at the hospital confided that the
case had merited much discussion during an incident review session and there
was clear consensus that the doctor and hospital were vulnerable to a malpractice claim. I am sure my friend, being a loyal member of the medical fraternity,
only told me this after it was quite apparent that I had fully recovered and had
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no thought of suing. Why should I? I was still alive and the orthopedic surgeon had done a boffo job on my badly broken ankle. But I remain convinced
that this was one act of medical malpractice for which no one was called to
account.
What if the worst had happened? What if I had died on the operating table
(assuming I can get readers to agree that this would have been a bad thing)?
Should the damages of my estate or spouse's wrongful death suit be artificially
capped, even for noneconomic damages? What if I was a spouse who did not
work outside the home? What about a worst case scenario: I survived, but in a
semi-vegetative state for twenty or thirty years, in pain and vaguely aware of
the situation. That is a hard thing on which to put a price. But personally
speaking, I regard that sort of pain, suffering, degradation, and truncation of
quality of life as both worse than death and worth more than the $350,000 23
now
provided by Nevada's cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damage.
This raises the question of another myth of sorts that surrounds medical
malpractice tort reform: the notion that all doctors and medical providers are
created equal, and that all are excellent. That, of course, is hogwash. All doctors and medical staff are not any more equal than are all lawyers, accountants,
bankers, carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers or left-handed pitchers. Some are
just better than others at what they do. Of course, not every doctor can be the
medical equivalent of Randy Johnson. 24 The best we can hope for is adequate
minimal competence, a goal we seek through education, training, licensing,
supervision, and, where necessary, discipline. But these systems can neither
work perfectly nor completely level the field. There will be differences in the
skill, care, and consistency of medical providers, just as there are differences in
other fields. As part of an effort to better understand malpractice dispute patterns, both the medical and legal communities should admit this inconvenient
fact and attempt to assess its role in malpractice claim patterns. My own trial
hypothesis is that the quality of medical care has a significant impact on the
frequency and severity of medical claims. Where claims are higher than "normal," as appears to be the case in Nevada, the medical community must
acknowledge the awkward possibility that this results from inferior quality
rather than more litigious patients or a more encouraging legal system than that
found in other states.
As to the second common claim of tort reformers, lack of deterrence and
defensive medicine, I again disagree. Recently, as a consequence of approaching age fifty, I had the pleasure of my first colonoscopy. For better or worse, it
was an incomplete pleasure. As the examination progressed, the doctor concluded at the first major hairpin turn in the organ (technically termed "grotesque redundancy"). The doctor stopped, fearing that continuing the
procedure raised an unacceptable risk of perforation of the colon and chance of
23

I should also give credit where credit is due. During my hip replacement surgery at the

Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota during 2002, I had an almost Nirvana-like anesthetic
experience, waking up rather alert after total anesthesia with no lingering ill side effects. In
fact, the entire experience was superb and the artificial hip appears to be working well. My
personal experience suggests that the Mayo Clinic's reputation for excellence is well
deserved.
24 Star pitcher for the Arizona Diamondbacks baseball team.
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infection. He quickly arranged for a barium enema X-ray procedure to
examine the remainder of the colon.
Was this foolish defensive medicine, or was it wise deterrence occasioned
not only by the doctor's medical judgment, but by fears of litigation if the
colonoscopy had continued and caused damage to the colon? Although no one
can be sure, I was extremely pleased that the doctor made this decision of
caution. Less than two years ago, a doctor conducting a similar procedure on
my father made the opposite decision, resulting in perforation and infection that
nearly killed my father. He was saved only by emergency surgery and hospitalization that cost considerably more than a barium enema X-Ray piggybacked
onto a colonoscopy. If what I got was the much maligned "defensive
medicine," then I owe unnamed attorneys thanks and can only hope that similar
caution is being induced all over America because of the tort and litigation
system.
Of course, the differences between my treatment and my father's treatment can also be read to mean that the litigation system makes little difference
in comparison to the physician's own professional judgment. One doctor
decided to refrain from challenging the grotesque redundancy while another
forged ahead with disastrous, nearly-fatal results. The more cat.tious doctor
was also working in a state with a less plaintiff-friendly malpractice regime.
Although extrapolation based on personal experience is always risky, my conclusion is that medical skill and judgment can vary enormously. Malpractice
does occur with disturbing frequency but is usually not catastrophic and usually
does not become the subject of a compensation claim. The existence of medical malpractice claim rights for patients encourages greater caution by medical
providers, which is more of a good thing than a bad thing, even though there is
some social cost occasioned by defensive medicine. But whatever the legal
regime, professional skill and judgment remains important, probably primary,
in determining the pattern of malpractice claims.
Another part of the competing perceptions of reality in the tort reform
debate relates to professional burdens and status. This factor is discussed in
greater length in Part III, below, regarding professionalism and tort reform.
Plaintiff lawyers, for example, rail against limits on recovery of compensatory
or punitive damages on grounds of fairness and deterrence. But the thinlyveiled reality for many of these lawyers is that they will take home one-third,
forty percent, or even half of any such awards to plaintiffs. If these trial lawyers really cared so much about their clients, one would expect to see more
graduated and creative fee schedules so that clients reaped more of the benefits
from successful prosecution of a civil litigation claim.
For doctors, the countervailing example is the cultivated (by doctors and
other tort reformers) perception that doctors are under relentless economic pressure as a result of legal claims. We hear of doctors "fleeing" plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictions or being hit with large increases in malpractice premiums. Part of
this story is true: doctors have it tougher than they did thirty to fifty years ago
in terms of the investment costs in training, equipment, staff, overhead, and
insurance. Add to that the tougher time they have gaining fair payment by
insurers for their services and there is no doubt that these are not the salad days
of the medical profession. Doctoring has become more bureaucratic and stress-
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ful. But relatively little of this seems to be the result of the legal system. It
appears to have much more to do with the changing market for the delivery of
medical services.25 Plaintiff lawyers did not increase the cost of medical
school or bring additional competitors into previously undersupplied areas like
Las Vegas. Lawyers were not the driving force behind HMOs, managed care,
or slow-pay health insurance. Neither did trial lawyers increase employee
costs, equipment costs, or overhead. The free market did that just fine by itself.
Although plaintiff claims have, of course, had some impact on malpractice
insurance premiums, insurance policy availability and pricing results from a
number of factors besides claim frequency and severity. In other words, even if
everything tort reformers say about a broken system is true, following the tort
reform blueprint will not necessarily lead to lower insurance prices in a given
region at a given time. As described in some detail during the Symposium by
Bill Bradley, the experience of having Nevada's largest medical malpractice
insurer acquired by a national insurer, which was intent on raising premium
dollars for investment through foolishly low pricing, resulted in large spikes in
premiums and the national insurer exiting not only the Nevada market, but the
entire business altogether.2 6
Although, as might be expected, various groups debate what drives insurance "crises" and premium increases, 2 7 the current jump in medical malpractice
has something in common with the jump in product liability premiums that
took place in the 1980s, with overly aggressive underwriting designed to gather
premium dollars to take advantage of high interest rates. In both cases, a dramatic downturn in investment income by insurers was followed by dramatic
increases in premiums or decreases in availability. Furthermore, this cycle of
"hard markets" (insurance is costly and tough to get) and "soft markets" (insurance is relatively cheap and easy to get) seems to repeat itself irrespective of
developments in the tort system.
Furthermore, because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 28 insurers are
largely exempt from federal antitrust regulation (although they are of course
regulated by the states on many fronts). As a result, insurers have relative
freedom to act collectively and they do so. 29 Regardless of whether this may
25

See Joseph B. Treaster, Aetna Settles Dentists' Suit Over Delays in Payments, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug. 19, 2003, at C5 (involving payments of more than $2.25 million); Joanne

Wojcile, HMOs Thriving in Orange County, Bus. INs., Aug. 18, 2003, at 19 ("The HMO

market is strong there because plans have responded to physician complaints that reimbursement rates were too low" and not necessarily because of California's medical malpractice
tort regime, as is frequently argued by Nevada tort reform proponents); Sarah Hoffman
Jurand, Doctors' Suit Against HMOs Certified as a Class Action: Patients' Class Denied,
TRIAL,

Dec. 2002, at 62; See also Reni Garner, Eye Surgeon Wins $31M "Bad Faith" Ver-

dict Against Disability Insurer, LAW. WKLY. USA, Mar. 24, 2003, at 20.
26 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 393 (remarks of Dean Hardy).
27 Compare J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Advocate Challenges Insurers on 'Crisis' in Med
Mal Mkt., NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 7, 2002, at 16, with Raymond R. Mazzotta, Hunter

Fires Blanks with "Smoking Gun,"
28

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW

NAT'L UNDERWRITER,

Nov. 11, 2002, at 12.

OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 2.03-.05 (2d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2003) (summarizing the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption of insurers from
federal antitrust law and state regulation; insurers are allowed substantial discretion to
collaborate).
29
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violate the "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" exception to McCarran-Ferguson's antitrust immunity, it suggests that insurance pricing and behavior is not
inexorably tied to the success of tort claimants.3 °
In short, the issue of insurance availability and the effect of litigation on
the cost of goods or services is too complex to lay at the feet of tort claimants.
Additionally, much of the clamor for tort reform overlooks another possibility
for the rise of insurance premiums: a good part of the premium increase may be
the result of plaintiff claims. But if these plaintiff claims are valid, why is the
solution to impose greater legal burdens on plaintiffs? An equally valid solution would appear to be to require that tortfeasors bear increased insurance
costs as the price of continuing to do business or stopping doing business if
they cannot internalize the costs of any injury they inflict. Although "Keep Our
Doctors in Nevada" or "Keep Our Builders in Nevada" may be great campaign
slogans, it may be that Nevada is better off if some doctors or builders go
elsewhere to inflict damage.
Finally, there is the financial bottom line, as driven home by Rick Harris's
anecdote about his conversation with a doctor friend who complained about a
steep rise in medical malpractice premiums. 3 ' To be sure, the premiums had
gone up substantially. But nonetheless, the doctor was still making a multimillion dollar income. One presumes that Rick's friend is a more financially
successful doctor than most, but how do I know? Maybe the bulk of doctors
make $3-4 million per year, in which case quarter-million dollar malpractice
premiums would not seem like cause for alarm or reason to constrict plaintiffs'
legal rights. Before determining when tort law patterns really call for legislative or judicial change, we should at least know the financial situation of the
persons claiming to be financially aggrieved by the system; and the persons or
entities seeking change should have to prove their hard times rather than ask
the policymakers to simply take them at their self-interested word.3 2
Thus far, I have only briefly touched upon the type of differing world
views attending the tort reform debate and the murky facts and excessive rhetoric involved. Although it is perhaps the classic "wimpy" academic response to
call for further study, substantial changes in the law should probably not proceed until we know much more than we do now about the actual face of tort
claims, insurance, and the economic status of the interested parties.
30 See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (permitting state

attorney general's action against insurers alleging anticompetitive behavior to go forward;
undisputed facts of the case reveal extensive collaboration by insurers and control of influence of key large insurers).
31 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 440 (remarks of Richard Harris, Esq.).
32 This goes, of course, for lawyers and insurers as well as doctors. My own pet idea for
legislative and lobbying reform is this: Anyone lobbying for legislative action must not only
disclose the manner in which they may benefit from the legislation but must also submit to
the legislature their federal tax returns for the preceding three years. Whether to believe
doctors or plaintiff lawyers on the issue of tort reform has something to do with the economic situation of these actors. If doctors are doing well in spite of higher insurance costs,
this argues against tort reform (at least as a form of relief for doctors). If plaintiff lawyers
are doing well, this is a factor in evaluating their opposition to tort reform and claim to
represent society's less fortunate, as well as for evaluating specific proposals such as contingency fee regulation.
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FORGETTING AND FAILING TO EXPLORE THE LESSONS OF
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

Behavioral sciences help to show the degree to which both sides of the
debate may have some valid points about cognitive errors made in analysis and
adjudication.3 3 Although human beings are amazingly thoughtful, their

thoughts are frequently not perfectly rational or rigorous. They make mistakes
of analysis or valuation through a variety of what might be termed processing
or analytical errors. To list some of the major ones briefly:
ConstructedPreferences or Heuristic Errors. These are errors of analysis

stemming from what might be termed misconfiguration of the problem. "Alternative descriptions of the same choice problems lead to systematically different
preferences." 3 4 Framing affects judgment, sometimes adversely. If a problem
is framed improperly, it is assessed improperly. One obvious example in the
tort reform arena is the degree to which proponents and opponents both seek a
particular framework for political ends. To follow on the discussion from the
previous section, if the problem of higher insurance costs is framed as a prob-

lem of higher claim costs, this produces a self-fulfilling prophecy (higher claim
costs must be the reason for higher insurance costs) which, in turn, unwisely
constrains the range of potential solutions to only those actions that reduce
claim costs when other factors may be more important. It also creates an inevi-

table momentum in favor of restricting claims even though past claims may
have been legitimate and should be permitted.
There are also a number of prominent cognitive tendencies labeled
"biases" by behavioral theorists. These include:
" Extremeness Aversion. This is a commonly-observed trait in people

who avoid taking what they would view as extreme positions based on
the context and framing of the questions. This leads to "compromise
affects" when people are presented with conflicting data or positions.
Applied to jury decisionmaking, this trait suggests that juries are intrinsically reluctant to make large awards or to completely reject a claim
of loss, but have some tendency to compromise the claims of plaintiffs

and defendants in this regard.35
" Hindsight Bias. "People often think, in hindsight, that things that happened were inevitable, or nearly so. . . . Judgments about whether
someone was negligent may well be affected by this bias."' 36 This cognitive trait is clearly one supporting tort reformers, particularly when
viewing the outcomes of medical procedures. For example, a jury may
see an adverse surgical outcome as the result of malpractice even
though the doctor and medical team were doing everything properly
from a pre-even perspective.
33

See Introduction to

BEHAVIORAL APPROACH SCIENCE AND THE LAW, LAW AND ECONOM-

ICS, (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL APPROACH] for an excellent overview of this discipline and examples of the cognitive errors frequently made by people in
assessing matters.
" See id. at 1-3.
35 Id. at 3-5.
36 Id. at 3-4.

Winter 2003/2004]

NOT-SO-PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

* Optimistic Bias. "Even factually informed people tend to think that

risks are less likely to materialize for themselves than for others" and
they have "systematic overconfidence in risk judgments. 3 7 Such optimism bias would appear to apply to patients, doctors, home buyers,
and home builders. It would seem that this bias could create negligent
or even foolish behavior by any of these actors, depending on the context. For example, a confident doctor, like a confident pilot, inspires
confidence. But confidence under the influence of the optimistic bias
can become overconfidence, leading to rushed or inopportune surgery
or unwise flight through a thunderstorm area.
" Status Quo Bias. This is a trait of human nature that makes humans
demand a great deal of proof or persuasion to justify change.38
Applied to litigation, it probably makes juries more pro-defendant than
is commonly presumed. Making a financial award to a plaintiff, even
when justified by persuasive legal claims, is something of a "Robin
Hood" move in that it takes resources from one party for the benefit of
another, altering the status quo. Applied to public policy, legislation,
and elections, the status quo bias probably operates to increase the burden on those seeking a change in laws or government.
" Self-Serving Bias. Self-serving bias is the tendency to overrate one's
own contributions to a household or entity. It is a "belief that one
deserves more than other people tend to think" and "affects both parties to a negotiation (including litigation settlement) and this makes
agreement very difficult." Applied to litigation and tort reform, the
effect of self-serving bias probably works to make plaintiffs feel
abused by the system (e.g., long waits for trial; cross-examination) and
defendants feel unduly burdened by litigation and unfairly forced to
pay for something that was not anyone's "fault," but rather simple bad
luck.
Another set of traits affecting human cognition is generally classified
under the rubric of "heuristics" and includes:
* Availability. "People tend to think that risks are more serious when an
incident is readily called to mind or "available." 3 9 This can result in
pervasive biases in risk assessment based on media portrayals of risk
and litigation outcomes. As discussed in Part I of this Comment, it can
result in people who will refuse to swim in the Pacific Ocean for fear
of the once-a-decade shark attack but who fail to wear a seat belt while
driving to work, despite the far greater risk of injury or death. The
narrative power of individual episodes is also important. In the infamous statement of Joseph Stalin, an instinctive behavioral scientist, "a
single death is a tragedy, a million deaths a statistic." Applied to perceptions of litigation, this explains why people focus inordinately on
the multi-million dollar verdict but forget or remain ignorant of the
overall picture more favorable to defendants.
37

Id.

38

Id.
Id. at 5.

39

at 4.
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Social Influence. Operating under this heuristic, persons unsure of the
right answer follow the crowd. 40 Applied to politics and public opinion, this produces the well-known "bandwagon" effect. Applied to litigation, it probably assists the quest for jury agreement but also
probably tends to prompt judicial behavior to converge on a mean. Put
another way, if most judges think that pain and suffering damages of
more than $500,000 are too high for most cases, you, too, will create
an informal but flexible cap in judicial review of jury awards.
" Anchoring. Use of an initial value (even one that is absurd) affects
probability judgments. At the risk of stating a tautology, people tend
to be anchored by an anchor - in either direction. 4 Applied to litigation claims, this suggests that plaintiff counsel are rewarded for asking
jurors for a large amount (e.g., claiming a million dollars pulls up the
jury horizon and increases the ultimate amount) or defendant counsel
are rewarded by refusing to acknowledge any liability or damage to a
claimant (asking for a verdict of zero pulls down the jury horizon and
decreases the ultimate amount of any plaintiffs award). As to the
anchoring heuristic, my own common sense antenna, and that of most
trial lawyers I know, suggests some inherent limits. A plaintiff asking
for $10 million for a hangnail is likely to be laughed out of court.
Likewise, a defendant who accuses an amputee of imagining injury
loses credibility. But where counsel act within some arguable range of
the reasonable, anchoring as part of trial presentation seems likely to
affect the size of awards.
* Case-based decisions. This is the tendency of people to avoid sweeping decisions and instead to make incremental, situation-specific decisions about particular problems at hand.42 Applied to litigation, it
suggests that defendants can mute "send them a message" monetary
awards by appealing to the more case-specific orientation of most
jurors. Similarly, plaintiff counsel can mute defendant efforts to suggest that a plaintiff's verdict in the case at hand will be the first of a
line of dominos leading to the fall of the company or economy.
Applied to politics, this suggests that voters and policymakers may be
more comfortable addressing an isolated aspect of tort reform (e.g.,
medical malpractice, construction defects) rather than taking global
action affecting the entire system. Such case-based decisions can be
good or bad, depending on one's agenda. One implication I draw is
that the more comprehensive tort reform program advocated by the
organization Common Good will be difficult to sell merely because it
is comprehensive. On the other hand, more targeted and incremental
efforts such as the Common Good proposal for medical malpractice
reform may receive a kind reception.4 3
*

40

41
42

41

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Symposium, supra note 1, at 407 (remarks of Nancy Udell, Esq.) (describing the

Common Good package of medical malpractice reforms).

Winter 2003/2004]

NOT-SO-PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Another group of behavioral science concepts can be classified as valuation traits among people. These include:
" Loss Aversion. Unsurprisingly, people do not like to lose the money or
property they possess. More precisely, people appear to place a greater
value (and correspondingly greater sorrow in the event of loss) on loss
of a dollar they currently possess than on a dollar they are unable to
attain. 44 This trait appears to hold, regardless of the event that occasioned the past or future loss and the equities of the past or future
deprivation. What matters is the wealth endowment effect. Taking
something you already have seems to hurt more than preventing you
from gaining the same thing.
* Mental Accounting. To the average person, money "comes in compartments" rather than being fungible.4 5 Because of this, it can be hard
to convert normative judgments into dollar amounts due to the absence
of a market. The problematic aspects of mental accounting undoubtedly explain some of the variance in tort awards (both by juries and
judges) but do not immediately supply a solution to the difficulties of
conversion.
In addition, behavioral scientists have observed in humans an ingrained
tendency toward reciprocity and fairness, labeling people as homo reciprocans,
creatures who will reciprocate in kind when assisted and appear not to violate
social norms of fairness even when it is in their economic interests to do so.4 6
Because the application of behavioral science concepts is relatively new to
law, it is too soon to determine the degree to which law will embrace this field
and too early to determine the consequences of any such incorporation. However, these basic concepts certainly illuminate litigation, public opinion, and
policymaking. At this juncture, it appears that some behavioral science axioms
support the case for tort reform while others suggest that the human element of
the system is not defective. Although the scholarly jury is still "out" in this
area, one lesson to be learned is the need for humility in assessment and caution
in changing the status quo.
IV.

PROFESSIONAL FRICTION AND MISUNDERSTANDING

Much of the push for tort reform has come from persons arguing that
modem litigation distorts or undermines private markets. Interestingly, the
"father" of modem market theory and veneration had this to say about professionals and their compensation:
We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in
people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as
may give them that rank in society which so important a trust requires. The long
4 See BEHAVIORAL APPROACH, supra note 33, at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
46 Id. at 8 (although it is doubtful that Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco executives were part of
45

the sample group in question).
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time and great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined
47
with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labour.

In other words, Adam Smith
tus for doctors and lawyers was
discharge of professional duties.
which doctors and lawyers agree.

thought that financial reward and social staa necessary evil to facilitate their effective
Most likely, this is still a proposition on
But in many other respects, doctors and law-

yers have moved far away from the brotherhood and mutual interest Smith

bestowed upon them. In today's third wave of modem tort reform, doctors and
lawyers are cast as antagonists locked in a zero-sum game to maintain or regain
economic and social standing.4 8
In 2002 and 2003, doctors have clearly been the winners in this tug-ofwar. The 2002 Special Legislative Session in Nevada produced a significant
tort reform bill, one which caps noneconomic damages at $350,000 unless the
injury inflicted was the result of "gross" malpractice proven by clear and convincing evidence.49 Perhaps thinking that nothing succeeds like success, the
physician lobby immediately returned to the 2003 legislature seeking even
more tort reform - even before there had been any significant experience under
the 2002 legislation. Specifically, doctors sought to reduce the cap on economic damages to $250,000 and to remove the verbal exceptions that could
permit awards above the cap, to limit awards of counsel fees, and to essentially
abolish joint-and-several liability in medical malpractice matters.50 The legislature did not act, setting the stage for voter consideration of this proposal in
the November 2004 election. A competing initiative supported by the Nevada
Trial Lawyers, which would increase the noneconomic damages cap for nonwage earners, will also be on the ballot.51
Momentum continues to be with the doctors on the issue of tort reform in
that they continue to exert political energy and keep the issue of medical practice reform in the press, presenting a picture of a profession under siege and in
need of protection. The lead organization in this effort, "Keep Our Doctors in
Nevada," even picked a name that exerts some subtle coercive pull on voters
and politicians: if doctors don't get what they want, they may pull up stakes
and go elsewhere, leaving Nevada with insufficient medical services. It is a
threat and a plea designed to get both attention and sympathy, and it illustrates
one of the differences between the professions and a natural advantage doctors
hold over lawyers. A lobbying effort to "keep our lawyers in Nevada" would
probably provoke more than a little laughter and not much legislative aid.
Examining the reasons behind this helps illuminate the differences between law
and medicine and their correspondingly different public perceptions.
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BK 1, Ch. 10, 111 (Prometheus Books ed.
1991).
48 See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463 (2002); M. Gregg
Bloche, Comment, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REv. 919
(2002).
49 See Irwin Simon, Medical Malpractice Legislation, COMMUNIQUE, Aug. 2003, at 30
(summarizing this and other aspects of the 2002 Legislation, Assembly Bill No. 1 of the
special session, which became effective Oct. 1, 2002).
50 Id. at 31.

4" ADAM

51

Id.
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Unlike lawyers, doctors touch the lives of nearly everyone. Despite the
absence of universal health insurance, virtually everyone is seen by a doctor
sometime (not counting birth) because of the health care infrastructure and the
frequency of medical needs. By contrast, many people never have professional
contact with a lawyer.52 Unless the family doctor is obnoxious, there will
probably be some reservoir of goodwill supporting doctor-based political initiatives. Correspondingly, it will be easier for doctors, manufacturers, or other
interest groups to call upon public sympathy and support, demonizing relatively
unknown attorneys if necessary.
In addition, a good deal of lay contact with doctors is non-threatening,
routine, and affirming (e.g., regular checkups, finding out that the tickle in your
throat is just a tickle). By contrast, lay interaction with lawyers is more mixed.
There are constructive interactions, such as estate planning (although even that
can be uncomfortable for many people) and home sales. But many of the interactions may be termed "destructive," such as when a person is embroiled in
litigation, faced with a domestic dispute, fired from a job just before a pension
vests, and so on. Under these circumstances, many individuals may associate
lawyers with negative experiences while associating doctors with positive
experiences.
To be sure, there are acute and traumatic circumstances confronting the
doctor-patient relationship (e.g., massive bleeding in the ER; emergency surgery) that usually far-outstrip the drama of even the hottest preliminary injunction hearing. But here, too, doctors appear to have an advantage. Doctors do
not operate in an adversary system. When a patient is treated at the hospital,
the doctor and everyone else in the room is attempting to make the patient
better (perhaps negligently, but at least everyone is trying to be part of the
solution rather than part of the problem). No other medical professionals
attempt to impede the treating physician. Contrast this with many, perhaps
most, of legal activity in an adversary system. Litigation is obviously different
than medicine. Roughly half of the lawyers involved in any matter are trying to
thwart one of the parties. Many transactions also have an element of opposition
and competition despite whatever "win-win" rhetoric may accompany the deal.
Additionally, medical and legal outcomes are dogged by a significant difference. Even where medical treatment does not produce an optimal "cure,"
neither is it a contest. All of the patients on "Ward J" at the local hospital can
live or get healthy without impeding the recovery or survival of the patients in
"Ward K." The same is not true in law. Again, roughly half of those using
legal services are likely to have some disappointment or sense of loss from
adverse verdicts, sub-optimal or thwarted transactions, property settlement, visitation rights, disappointing inheritance, regulatory imposition, etc. A large
percentage of legal events leave some participants at the short end of the stick.
This is simply not the case with medicine. To be sure, adverse outcomes are
disappointing, even tragic. But they are not the norm. Neither is contention or
conflict. Doctors and adversely-affected patients or their representatives take
52 See BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977); Russell G. Pearce,
Patrick W. Shea, & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategiesfor
Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980).
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medical practice emotionally and personally. But disappointment and conflict
are not a chronic part of medicine as with many areas of law. Thus, doctors
start with an embedded advantage over lawyers in the battle for the hearts and
minds of politicians and the public.
But both doctors and lawyers also have something in common: they are
professionals by training and acculturation. This gives them a kinship of expertise, self-regulation, codes of conduct, frequent exercise of discretion, and probably no shortage of ego. In recent times, both doctors and lawyers have found
their professional status under siege. Doctors have been hit with managed care
and third-party payer controls on top of whatever other economic and legal
pressures they face. Many lawyers have similar pressures from insurers who
retain them and increasing government regulation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. 53

One of the interesting ironies of the medical malpractice debate is the way
in which insurers have been able to play lago with lawyers and doctors in the
roles of Desdamona and Othello (readers can decide who is who). Insurers
have been a source of a good deal of trouble for both lawyers (e.g., case management guidelines) and doctors (medical payments restrictions, delays and setoffs).5 4 Yet somehow, the liability insurer cousins of the health insurers,
HMOs, and managed care administrators who have largely made life miserable
for physicians during the past thirty years, have convinced doctors that lawyers
are to blame for all of their problems.5 5 This is the Stockholm Syndrome on
steroids: doctors carrying the tort reform water for insurers who make poor
53 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201
(2002)).
54 Consider the advertisements in the campaign for tort reform, including one run in Nevada
suggesting the following syllogism: (a) "My Husband Died Because the Trauma Unit Was
Closed"; (b) "Because of High Insurance Costs"; (c) "Because of a Lawsuit"; and (d) "He
Would Have Surely Lived if it was Open"; therefore, (e) "The Lawyers and Their Lawsuits
are Responsible for Closing the Trauma Unit and Killing My Husband." I hope I don't have
to work too hard to convince readers of the Nevada Law Journal that this sort of answer
would probably flunk the proximate cause aspect of a basic first-year torts exam. The fairest
thing to say is probably that the trauma center may have closed for any number of reasons.
The second fairest thing to say is that there is no certainty that the husband at issue would
have survived if the trauma center had been next door. The third fairest assessment is probably that insurance for medical facilities is problematic and bears examination. Poor operations or self-serving conduct by insurers may have been the most important factor in the
close of the trauma center. A fourth possibility is that the trauma center wasn't very good
and any lawsuit that brought about its closure was a public service. At some point, one can
think that the availability of medical services is a lawyer-centered problem, but one would
have to try a lot of other possible explanations before getting to this point. My point is
simply that this kind of "2 + 2 = Blame the Lawyers" thinking has become an unfortunate
characteristic of the tort reform debate and lobbying efforts.
55 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). Reviewing a $145
million award of punitive damages affirmed by a nearly unanimous Utah Supreme Court,
which found sufficient reprehensible misconduct (a Company-wide scheme to chisel the
near-fiduciary policyholders and to target the "weakest of the herd"), the United States
Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 vote. But only Justice Ginsburg seems to have disagreed
on the merits and supported the Utah Supreme Court and the punitive damages award on the
merits. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented because they did not believe that the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized federal courts to supervise state
court punitive damages awards.
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underwriting decisions (e.g., problematic doctors continue to get coverage, raising rates for competent physicians who never had a claim), cut rates and then
triple them when the investment climate changes, exit states, and stop writing
coverage abruptly. A sociologist from Mars would find doctor affinity with
insurers and antipathy toward lawyers a bit amazing.
Without doubt, lawyers have something to do with this to the extent some
lawyers have failed to make serious efforts at ADR, been unduly combative or
even abusive to defendant physicians, or even brought unfounded claims. And
even under the most civil of circumstances, attorneys become the personified
embodiment of a legal attack on a doctor's professional competence. That may
explain some of the antipathy, but still fails to explain why insurers have been
able to figuratively hold the coat of the medical profession while blaming
problems on the legal profession.
Some of the answer, much of it underemphasized in the mainstream tort
reform literature, may be the socio-professional divide that develops between
doctors and lawyers well before they are faced with malpractice litigation. To
some extent, the tension between the professions is almost hereditary or
genetic. To the extent that a doctor's parent is a professional, the parent is far
more likely to be a doctor than a lawyer. So, too, with lawyers and their parents. The pathologies of professional misunderstanding may infect both doctors and lawyers before they even arrive at college for pre-med and pre-law
courses.
Although it is hard to measure the long-running Hatfield-and-McCoy
aspects of the doctor-lawyer relationship, the feud (encompassing both goodnatured ribbing and some real venom) is apparent. Consider the long-standing
joke offered by pre-law and law students to their medical counterparts: "200
years ago, lawyers were writing the Constitution. Doctors were putting leeches
on George Washington." Doctors can respond with any number of lawyer
jokes widely circulated among the general populace (e.g., "What do you call
56
300 lawyers at the bottom of the ocean? A good start.").
A good chunk of the tort reform imbroglio could probably be ameliorated
if doctors and lawyers could rediscover and renew professional kinship rather
than crafting morality plays featuring the other as villains. Both professions are
under the greatest stress and serious threats to their professional models in a
century. For both, there is the threat of reduced autonomy and independence as
outside forces attempt to control and direct their professional judgment. For
lawyers, the challenge is presented by profitable but micro-managing clients or
insurers, who are technically third-party payers and not true clients, but who are
big users of legal services with considerable clout. For both doctors and lawyers, there is a threat of increased government regulation and the risk that their
traditional self-regulation will be supplanted by greater bureaucratic control.
And for both there is the risk that economic factors that have already bent the
traditional professional model of delivering services will distort it out of shape
altogether.
56 See also Marc

(2002).
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A classic illustration is the organization of the modem doctor's office. In
an effort to enjoy economies of scale and the economic benefit from delegation
of some duties to clerical and para-professional staff, the typical doctor's office
today is more like Wal-Mart than Norman Rockwell. There is the usual intake
bureaucracy, followed by a significant stint in the waiting room, serenaded by a
loud television presenting something edifying like "The Price Is Right" or a
"better abs" infomercial. This makes a patient feel downright treasured by his
physician. Doctors have also moved fairly far away from the historical "professional-as-friend" model by attempting to force patients to sign arbitration
agreements upon intake. My own experience with the waiting time at the
average doctor's office suggests that one-hour waiting times are now standard.
The doctors (including ones I like and whose skills I value) no longer even
apologize for a sixty-minute or ninety-minute wait. Apparently, this sort of
delay is no longer even considered something meriting a perfunctory effort to
make amends. Fortunately, in my line of work, there's always a lot of reading
to be done, although I could do it much more productively in another setting
(sans Bob Barker or the infomercial).
Of course, not every patient handles the wait well. Recently, one frustrated patient filed - you guessed - a lawsuit against a doctor who kept him
waiting for three hours.58 This kind of litigation is a bit silly, of course. But
silly as the "long wait" lawsuit may be, it did not shock me; what shocked me
was the comment on the suit made by Las Vegas doctor Rudy Manthei, Chairman of "Keep Our Doctors in Nevada." According to Dr. Manthei, patient
pile-ups are an inevitable part of modem medical practice because the "only
way to make it is to overbook patients and see as many as we can."5 9 Clearly,
Marcus Welby doesn't live here anymore. Although I should give Dr. Manthei
points for candor, I also have to note that this sort of patient practice simply is
not consistent with the delivery of professional services to clients rather than
selling fungible goods to customers. Although the Marcus Welby-style cottage-industry of kindly family doctors making house calls may be a thing of the
past, the professional ideal should still employ enough of a commitment to
service so that a doctor actually begins the day intending to see a particular
patient at the time scheduled rather than employing calendar Darwinism to
raise profits.
After some reflection, I realized that I should not have been so taken aback
by Dr. Manthei's admitted style of operation. I was once a patient of Dr.
Manthei's - for one eye examination appointment - and my experience was
perfectly consistent with the cavalry charge style of scheduling suggested by
his statement. His office (Nevada Eye and Ear, a modem name much easier to
remember than Drs. Smith & Jones, etc.) was large, modem, and reasonably
57 See Joelle Babula, Valley Health Care: Group Won't Arbitrate Medical Cases, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 7, 2003, at B 1 (quoting an American Arbitration Association official:
"It's not fair to ask a person who's going in for medical treatment to sign an arbitration
agreement ... Unless a patient indicates they want arbitration after a dispute, we won't
handle it anymore.").
58

See Joelle Babula, Las Vegas Patient'sPatience Runs Out: Man Sues Doctorfor ThreeLAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 29, 2003, at IA.

Hour Wait,
59

Id. at 5A.
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comfortable, but not comfortable enough to make the long wait all that sufferable. My recollection is that I was in the waiting area for about two hours,
followed by several minutes in the examination room, where I was first seen by
an assistant. The real doctor himself did not arrive until perhaps the 2.5 hour
mark, which then featured about 3.5 minutes of physician care.
Although Dr. Manthei seemed knowledgeable and competent, the whole
experience left me a bit cold, and the office struck me as a mill. Perhaps a mill
operated by skilled doctors, but a mill nonetheless. I never went back and
instead now see a different eye doctor who operates his own small practice. In
my visits thus far to this doctor (Mark Dubrova), I have never waited more than
ten minutes, never been screened by a para-professional, and never felt hurried.
To the contrary, Dr. Dubrova is willing (or at least has convinced me and other
patients that he is willing) to take whatever time is necessary to answer patient
questions. For me, at least, the experience as a Dubrova patient has been substantially preferable to being a Manthei patient.
Of course, it would not surprise me to find out that Dr. Manthei makes a
lot more money than Dr. Dubrova. But if something goes wrong with an eye
treatment or diagnosis, which doctor is more likely to be sued by a patient?
One need not be a rocket scientist to see the difference in their practice operations and to anticipate its potential effect on the number and intensity of possible malpractice claims.6" My thesis is that smaller, more human-scale practices
engender more patient goodwill and can reduce medical malpractice exposure
as a practical matter (and perhaps reducing incidents of malpractice because a
less hurried physician is more directly involved in providing medical services).
Of course, doctors are free to practice in a more modem manner to gain a more
profitable economy of scale. But in doing so, they should realize that they will
need to invest some of those higher gross revenues in the purchase of more
medical malpractice insurance to compensate for the human professional capital that is not being spent.
Although this is another area where lawyers may parallel doctors, the differences between the two professions remain significant, even in this relatively
"minor" area of client relations. Comparing the modem, Manthei-style medical
clinic to a high level law office underscores the difference. I doubt if an attorney at Lionel Sawyer & Collins, Beckley Singleton, or Gordon & Silver6 1 has
ever kept a client waiting in the lobby for more than ten minutes. And during
whatever waiting time occurs, the client is offered more comfortable surroundings and refreshments in lieu of the "Price is Right" or details on the wonder-ab
machine. In this strata of law practice, lawyers continue to give far more personalized service than doctors.
But medical care in America is far more egalitarian than legal care. The
same insurance that has bureaucratized medicine has also expanded public
access to even the finest medical care. Very few individuals in need of legal
services can afford any of the three law firms mentioned in the paragraph
above. But with enough time and persistence, anyone with a good health insur60 Dr. Mark Dubrova also enjoys an additional layer of deterrent protection in that his

father, Dr. Max Dubrova, is one of my favorite former students (although I don't think this
has affected my assessment of the younger Dubrova's medical operation).
61 These firms all have offices in Las Vegas, Nevada.

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:337

ance plan can usually get to see even a world-renowned physician. For example, my hip replacement at the Mayo Clinic was done by the same surgeon who
replaced the hips of former president George H.W. Bush and former first lady
Barbara Bush. By contrast, an ordinary layman would have no realistic chance
of hiring Barry Richard or David Boies, the lawyers most prominently involved
in the Bush v.. Gore6 2 litigation.
But despite giving medical care its due on this score, the different practices on client waiting reflect different professional norms, even when comparing apples to apples. If instead of a large, elite business law firm we compared
large medical clinics to law firms aimed at individuals rather than businesses,
we would continue to see a gulf between the two worlds. For example, in a law
firm geared toward review and intake of personal injury claims, one expects
that most of the initial screening will be by legal assistants and there will be
some waiting, or the requirement of a second visit to see a lawyer, if the case is
one of interest to the firm. But would even the busiest personal injury mill
keep a prospective client waiting three hours or more before getting to talk to at
least a staff member? I doubt it. Like other aspects of the tort reform debate,
the role of practice organization and delivery could stand more examination
and appreciation. Many doctors, and perhaps a significant number of lawyers,
should at least consider the possibility that larger operations and more detached
client relations may be the source of a good deal of problems, such as declining
status and more frequent claims.
V.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS CLOUDING AND CROWDING OUT SUBSTANTIVE
RATIONALITY; DEEP-SEEDED POLARIZATION OF SOCIETY ON

THESE ISSUES

As discussed above, much discussion of tort reform has become
politicized. The debate is often not one of reasoned argumentation so much as
a fight on the level of a political campaign. This campaign has been long on
emotion and marketing but short on analysis and reflection. Interest groups
dominate debate and attempt to manage the information flow - or anecdote
flow - to legislators. James Madison's nightmare of "faction" unhealthy for
the Republic appears to have become the reality surrounding tort reform.
A characteristic of the current tort reform movement that arguably distinguishes it from the first medical malpractice "crisis" of the 1970s, and the
insurance/product liability crisis of the 1980s, is that this wave of tort reform is
clearly a production of interest groups and is based on preferences more than a
clear emergence of a large problem or a groundswell of public sentiment. In
the 1970s, doctors were not merely facing large premium increases or the availability problems created by company decisions to change corporate strategy
(e.g., St. Paul's withdrawal from Nevada). There were more refusals to underwrite, the unavailability of "tail" coverage for retiring physicians, 63 and allegations of coercive insurance company action to force changes in policy terms.
In the 1980s, many insurers refused to write for the sort of risks that got
public notice, including parks, schools, child care centers, and other walks of
U.S. 98 (2000).
See Symposium, supra note 1, at 393 (remarks of Dean Hardy).
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life that affected the populace at large. To be sure, a hardening of the product
liability market also characterized the crisis. While there were efforts at product liability tort reform and construction of claimant rights, this ultimately
proved not to be the primary means by which the 1980s crisis was "solved."
Instead, manufacturers and insurance brokers formed new entities for selfinsurance, risk retention groups, captive insurers, or offshore insurers in insurance shrines such as Bermuda. One of today's most successful insurers, ACE,
was bom out of this ferment and today has acquired or is larger than many of
the insurers that spurned product liability risks during the 1980s.
Today's early twenty-first century push for tort reform is bit different.
Until organizations of contractors or doctors became energized (with insurers
arguably playing puppeteer), it was far from obvious that there was a tort crisis.
Despite the alleged burdens of Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 40, homes
were being built undeterred in southern Nevada (indeed, as Bill Robinson
reminds us, that was part of the problem 64). There was no general stoppage of
growth. Subdivisions were not being shut down because of a complete dearth
of available insurance. Contrast this with the closings of public pools, parks,
and day care centers during the 1980s.
Similarly, prior to the well-organized physician and insurer lobbying that
produced the 2002 special session, there continued to be a net influx of doctors
into Nevada and much medical activity, though one can of course point to isolated instances where the financial burden of a malpractice premium increase
prompted a few doctors to relocate or make other career changes. Even giving
credence to the most alarmist news accounts, it appears that only one medical
specialty (obstetrics) was facing the problem of constriction in services due to
high insurance costs. Even making the inferential leap that these insurance
price rises were entirely the fault of defects in the legal system, this hardly
justifies across-the-board tort reform. A more measured analysis would seemingly conclude that any reforms should be directed at availability of insurance
or targeted at protecting obstetricians. Like most folks, I would like to live in a
society where every mother has quality medical care during pregnancy and
delivery (and childhood for that matter). But does this mean we need a damage
cap when plastic surgeons, orthopedists, allergists, or dermatologists commit
malpractice?
While I realize others will disagree, my view is that calling recent
problems in construction and medicine a "crisis" is hyperbole. One can even
argue that these two industries were simply faced with worse-than-usual economic pressures on their profitability and operation. While this may be regrettable, in a market-based economy the default rule is one of letting the chips fall
where they may and minimizing government activity to aid any particular
industry. Sure, we violate that default rule all the time: regulated industries, aid
to distressed industries, legislation based on political favoritism, etc. But generally American government tries not to pick favorites in legislation affecting
business operations, absent a compelling case. The case for medical malpractice reform, at least of the type sought by doctor interests (more on the Com64

See Symposium, supra note 1, at 383 (remarks of William J. Robinson).
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mon Good proposals in Part VI), was not convincingly made. I am even less
65
convinced that there is any case for legislation to aid contractors.
But without doubt, the most organized business group in Nevada during
the past eighteen months has been the medical lobby, although the always powerful casino interests cannot be too far behind, even if their influence is hard to
detect. Although not as successful, construction contractors have also been
organized and politically active. As evidenced by this Symposium, doctors and
contractors have put "it's all about me" tort reform on the metaphorical front
burner of Nevada politics. The current tort reform debate in Nevada, for the
most part, has not been a comprehensive discussion about global change and
improvement of the legal system.
Interest group activity, even when successful, has a politicizing and sometimes polarizing effect. As in Newtonian physics, political action appears to
spur an equal and opposite reaction. Tort reform efforts engender opposition
from plaintiff lawyers and consumer groups. Once started, the cycle is hard to
stop, as evidenced by developments of the last thirty years.
To some extent, the tort reform debate is also a reflection of the sharp split
in American society overall. Much has been written about "Red-State
America" (the inland states where a majority of voters supported George Bush
in the 2000 presidential election) and "Blue-State America" (the mostly coastal
states, save for the South, that supported Al Gore in the 2000 election). To be
sure, this sketch is a caricature. For example, in Nevada, a Bush Red State,
nearly half of the voters chose Gore. But that division is arguably more problematic, at least for state policymaking, than is the Red State-Blue State division that obviously raises the distributional stakes of federal policy.
As reflected by the Bush-Gore division, we have an evenly but sharply
divided polity in this country. Not only was the Bush-Gore election close
(arguably decided by one vote),66 but the candidates were comparatively far
apart ideologically and philosophically.67 Where the explicit partisan politics
are so divided, it should come as no surprise that views on the legal system are
At some point, even the most self-interested policymaker, who glories in obtaining the
favor of the powerful, needs to ask whether legislation is fair. Thousands of businesses
operate in Nevada subject to the general legal regime. Why should certain businesses, such
as home construction or delivery of medical care, receive more favorable treatment than the
bulk of businesses? Until there is a good answer to that question, governments should be
very wary of changing the law in favor of select business groups.
66 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (the Supreme Court, in a contentious 5-4 decision,
halts efforts to recount votes in Florida, effectively giving Florida's electoral votes to Bush
[whose brother was noncoincidently Governor of Florida] whose electoral process was presided over by Secretary of State Katherine Harris, an avowed Bush partisan and later Republican congresswoman from Florida; Bush won the electoral vote and became the 43rd
President, but Gore received 500,000 more popular votes).
67 I realize everything is relative. The differences between Bush and Gore were hardly as
sharp as those frequently seen in Europe, where among a handful of serious candidates for
office there may be a fascist, a Christian Democrat, a Socialist, a Communist, and someone
from the Green Party. But the Bush-Gore difference seems relatively large in historical
perspective. Most observers would agree, I think, that the conservative-liberal split found
between Bush and Gore was considerably wider than that found regarding the Clinton-Dole,
Bush-Dukakis, Carter-Ford, or Kennedy-Nixon contests. But neither is sharp division foreign to American presidential elections. Consider Johnson-Goldwater and Reagan versus
Carter or Mondale.
65
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also sharply divided. 68 Even for elections considered to be "landslides," deep
divisions remain. Although Ronald Reagan arguably rolled over Walter
Mondale in 1984, the fact remains that tens of millions of Americans voted for
Mondale and implicitly had strong disagreements with Reagan policies.
With political division comes cultural division. Arguably, Americans are
in the midst of a modest (and thankfully largely nonviolent) culture war. Consider debates over abortion, bilingual education, immigration, prayer in
schools, biblical monuments, the Clinton impeachment and trial, and gay rights
(a topic made expressly political in its divisiveness because of efforts to amend
the Nevada Constitution to outlaw gay marriage). A telling (and to me disturbing) political statistic is that regular churchgoers are more than twice as
likely to vote Republican. Although I do not want to enter the fray as to
whether Jesus would raise or lower taxes or what his position might have been
on Iraq (much less his political affiliation), I cannot help but be a bit worried
when politics and religion are closely aligned, even implicitly.
In short, despite its current functionality, America is a pretty divided
place, at least in terms of attitude if not behavior. It should not, therefore,
surprise us that some people think all plaintiffs are wimps or scam artists while
others think all manufacturers are heartless cheats. Nor should we be surprised
that some people like doctors and hate lawyers and a few even like lawyers and
hate doctors. Some folks think homeowners' associations are complaining
about the real estate equivalent of a hangnail (e.g., displeasing landscaping)
while others see contractors knowingly profiting from shoddy work, covering it
up with sheetrock and stucco, and then waiting for the statute of limitations to
run its course or daring the disgruntled homeowner to sue. In twenty-first century America, people just disagree, often intensely, and they are roughly evenly
divided on many major questions.
Add to this professional misunderstanding and rivalry, such as the doctorlawyer gulf. Also add the interest group activity and economic self-interest.
Further, add efforts at media manipulation from all sides and news coverage
that tends to operate at the sound bit level. This is a recipe for cold war on the
tort reform front. Under the circumstances, why should we expect anything
different?
VI.

A

PROBLEM OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE;

A

PROBLEM OF

FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION

In addition to the political and sociological factors at work, legal reform is
also pervaded by fundamental philosophical difficulty. Even assuming the
most neutral and disinterested analysis, the proper course of legal reform is
hard to determine. To a large degree, this is simply because a good legal system involves some intellectual trade-offs. We have juries but we give trial
68 And politicians may stoke the fires where it is perceived as good electoral politics. See
Dana Milbank, The PoliticalMind Behind Tort Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A21
(noting the active role played by Karl Rove, President George Bush's chief advisor, in promoting tort reform as part of the Bush Administration and Republican political agenda). See
also Jeanne Cummings, Doctors' Activism Revives Malpractice Bill, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13,
2003, at A4.
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judges substantial power over them through pretrial motions that may narrow
or even eliminate the case. Judges also control the evidence a jury may hear
and have authority to overturn verdicts, force their modification, or order a new
trial. Although trial judges have wide discretion, they are subject to appellate
review, where reversal, modification, or remand can occur. Courts have great
power over adjudication but can be legislatively overruled through passage of
new or amended statutes. The executive, the organized bar, and the public also
have considerable power over courts because of their role in judicial selection,
especially in a state that directly elects its judges. Numerous other examples of
tradeoffs and compromise in the legal architecture could be listed.69
Further, law is pervaded by one hard core trade contradiction that seems
fundamental to the enterprise: the conflict between rules and discretion. To
some extent, preferences within the legal academy mirror this fundamental difference in orientation. Some professors are "rule" people. Others are "discretion" or "standards" people (favoring more relaxed and flexible versions of
rules). These differences tend to get more explicitly identified and debated in
the academy,70 but they are clearly also part of the dialogue of judges and
lawyers. 7 1 Laypersons may not be as self-conscious about their stand on the
rules-discretion debate, but most people implicitly have a position. For example, do you support "three-strikes-and-you're-out" criminal sentencing or
should judges have more discretion to shape a sentence to the individual defendant? Are you with or against John Ashcroft in his effort to prevent
judges
7
from making downward departures from the sentencing guidelines?
This sort of rules-versus-discretion division so permeates analysis of
American law that arguable contradictions can pervade the analysis of a single
person. Normally we at least like to think we are consistent, even if the organizations with which we interact are not. But consider the writings of Philip
Howard, founder of Common Good, and arguably America's most prominent
69 See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PRIMER

chs. 3, 4 (1994).

70 To illustrate, I invoke a conversation I still remember after fifteen years. When I was on

the Brooklyn Law School faculty, then-Dean David Trager (now a federal district judge) was
debating a point with Professor Aaron Twerski concerning their mutual field of expertise,
conflict of laws. After some discussion, they were at loggerheads, whereupon Trager (a
former U.S. Attorney and Republican) commented: "You know, Aaron, this is what always
happens with us on these topics. You like rules; I like standards and discretion. You want
more certainty and predictability; I'm more concerned that the result make sense in the case
at hand. You have your perspective, I have mine. We're just never going to agree on some
of these things." In a nutshell, this exchange explains a lot about divisions within the bench
and the legal profession. Although one, of course, needs to be careful that discretion does
not become arbitrariness, my own preference is for bounded discretion rather than rigid
rules.
71 Compare Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989) (lionizing rules) with Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and the
Justices of Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24 (1992) (supporting standards and discretion).
72 For the record, in what should come as no surprise, I am against the Ashcroft initiative
and against overly restrictive sentencing guidelines generally. I am more comfortable with
judges, who are far more familiar with the defendant and the case than Congress, the Attorney General, or a Sentencing Commission exercising their discretion when determining sentencing. I also am very uncomfortable with the Attorney General's efforts because they tend
to give the erroneous impression that judges are standardless scofflaws.
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proponent of legal reform.73 Notwithstanding efforts to avoid labels, Howard
has been referred to as the new "star" of the tort reform world by some observers. Another contender for that position, but one who has been on the tort
reform scene considerably longer, is former University of Cincinnati Dean
Victor Schwartz, general counsel to the American Tort Reform Association and
a partner in the Shook, Hardy & Bacon law firm in Washington, D.C. 74 Howard's two books, The Death of Common Sense and The Collapse of the Common Good 7 5 are the rough equivalent of a manifesto for tort reformers, even if
Howard prefers to call himself a legal reformer.
Both books are entertaining, well-written, provocative, and make many
cogent points. But both books are very different in terms of orientation and
framing of the legal reform problem despite the similarities of their titles and
the perhaps marketing-driven tendency to be more shrill than necessary (e.g.,
law "suffocating" America or lawsuits "undermining our freedom"; many in
other countries of the world would gladly suffer some of this suffocation or
impingement of freedom in order to enjoy access to American courts and the
protections of American law). Common Sense is a book advocating greater
discretion in the application of law to the world, while Common Good advocates more rules. Although both can be seen as "anti-law" books on the surface, both in fact advocate more law - but quite different kinds of law.
Common Sense wants decisionmakers to make discretionary rulings that have
legal precedence over rigid and bureaucratic legal rules. Common Good wants
to have more legal rules designed to limit lawsuits, claims, and damages.
Unsurprisingly, I found myself in agreement with Common Sense more
than Common Good, in large part because the book was more anti-bureaucracy
and less anti-lawyer than Common Sense, which at times veered toward being a
lawyer bashing diatribe (a bit jarring coming from an author who is a partner at
Covington & Burling, a large national firm). Common Sense is chock-full of
similar such accounts where blind adherence to rules and regulations produces
stupid, wasteful, inefficient outcomes. Perhaps most frequently cited is the
"Mother Theresa story." A Catholic charity group affiliated with the famous
saint sought to build a homeless shelter in the Bronx. The ever-watchful regulators of New York City thwarted the effort by insisting upon adherence to
technical building regulations (requiring an elevator, which the old renovated
building did not have) that made the cost of the project prohibitive. The regulators were unwilling (they might say unable) to grant a variance, even for
73 Howard, Common Good counsel Nancy Udell (see Symposium, supra note 1, at 407
(remarks of Nancy Udell)), and the Common Good organization all take pains to point out
that they are seeking more comprehensive changes in the legal system and American disputing culture and they are not a "tort reform" group as such. But much of the Common Good
agenda overlaps or abuts portions of the tort reform agenda and debate. See, e.g., COMMON
GOOD, ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF MEDICAL JUSTICE (2003) (white paper advocating significant changes in handling of medical malpractice claims).
74 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REV. 47 (2002).
15 See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994) [hereinafter COMMON SENSE]; PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2001)

[hereinafter

COMMON GOOD].
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Mother Theresa. As a result, the project was abandoned and New York was
denied the benefits of this social welfare effort.7 6 These and other stories from
Common Sense leave the reader shaking his or her head at the wooden, uninspired thinking (or lack of thinking) found in so many rulemakers and petty
regulators. 77
Common Sense is a searing critique of this corner of the status quo, but is
not really a critique of law per se. Rather, it skewers a particular sort of government regulation that is arguably law but which many law teachers would
look down upon as primitive or infantile law. 78 In many of Howard's anecdotes, the villain is not even a lawyer but instead a nonlawyer bureaucrat with
just enough knowledge of law and rules to be dangerous.7 9 Or the villain is the
text of a law that is applied too literally and inflexibly.8 ° One cannot help but
read Common Sense without concluding that inflexible application of rules in
violation of common sense is a major cause of arteriosclerosis of government
and other organizations.
But does Howard's critique in Common Sense make a case for discarding
or drastically limiting law, legal rights, and legal relief? I think not. Rather,
Common Sense makes a convincing brief for taming and controlling bureaucracy, an enterprise involving law but one that is not law itself. To the extent
that the bad bureaucracy identified by Howard is law, it is highly formalistic,
COMMON SENSE, supra note 75, at 3-5.
See id. at 30 (noting the requirement of a food inspector on site that leaves the inspector
killing time at the post); id. at 34 (noting an EPA requirement to use expensive pollution
scrubbers for smokestacks when use of low sulphur western coal would have been cheaper
and more effective); id. at 35 (criticizing the rigidity of the Judicial Sentencing Commission); id. at 49 (noting that tax law treating child care workers as subject to social security
withholding is widely ignored); id. at 60 (relating how the Chicago maintenance department
insisted on following a competitive bid process rather than moving swiftly to fix a problem
that resulted in a massive, destructive flood of the Chicago River); id. at 102-03 (describing
how civil service job protections lead to abuse by a bellicose employee, who was rewarded
for misbehavior with nine-months of paid leave). See also id. at 10-22 (noting the importance of discretion and judgment in preference to rigid rules. To be fair, COMMON GOOD
also has its share of good stories and does not ignore bureaucratic foibles. In one scene
related in COMMON GOOD, Howard illustrates the inefficiency and cost of stupid or lazy
adherence to rigid rules and formal logic. Nancy Udell, then a teacher in the New York City
school system prior to becoming a lawyer, noticed some rather disgusting matter on a window of her classroom. She asked a janitor to clean up the matter and was pointedly told by
the janitor that his union contract required only that he clean windows on a set schedule.
One cannot help but read this account and conclude that (a) sharply defined rules for division
of labor are the ticket to organizational inefficiency; and (b) formalistic adherence to rules,
like patriotism, can be the last refuge of the scoundrel, or at least a lazy janitor.
78 Most law professors I know find that much of the challenge of educating law students
comes not from getting them to absorb substantive rules but in getting them to think critically about the rules and their application, and to reason in ways that are more flexible than
those of the bureaucrats profiled in COMMON SENSE. Although it is perhaps an elitist conceit
of the academy, most every law professor I know looks down upon hyper-formal, rigidly
rule-based bureaucratic thinking as something infantile and primitive, much like the view
toward rules held by a child or martinet elementary school teacher. Real "law," or at least
the higher forms of law, involves more subtle, nuanced thinking that endeavors to keep sight
of the underlying objectives of the law while applying the groundrules (or standards) for
decision.
71 See COMMON SENSE, supra note 75, illustrations discussed at n.77.
80 Id. at 62-103.
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stiff law that has become laughable because its sole objective has become
adherence to formal rules rather than attainment of the goals that begat the rules
in question. One obvious solution to much of the foolishness chronicled in
Common Sense is more judicious use of discretion (a/k/a common sense) by the
actors involved (and rules that permit actors to use their common sense and
discretion). Howard advocates this specifically and he is right. But he arguably fails to recognize that the sort of improvement he advocates does not
require a "turn against law."
In contrast to Common Sense, Common Good is a book suggesting that
litigants have abused their legal rights and freedom of court access. The solution in Common Good is use of more rigid rules to impose limits in order to
rein in allegedly problematic or erroneous exercises of discretion and baseless
claims not clearly foreclosed by the current system of legal rules (which Howard implicitly suggests is inadequate, a sharp contrast with his view in Common
Sense). Thus, while Common Sense is a plea for standards and discretion,
Common Good is a plea for rules and contraction of law and legal prerogatives.
In my view, Common Good is far less effective and convincing than Common Sense. Part of this is because I am more attracted to standards, discretion,
and instrumentalism than to rules and formalism. But in addition, the anecdotes strung together in Common Good are not, for me, as compelling as those
in Common Sense. Common Sense contains many stories where most reasonable observers would come to a shared view as to the foolishness of the conduct
in question. Although Common Good also has some of this, many of the stories in Common Good are like the dueling anecdotes of the tort reform debate.
They can certainly be seen by one faction as evidence of a "broken" system,
but they can be seen equally well as legitimate claims or minor irritants that
should be permitted as a price paid for a legal system able to vindicate more
valid claims. Common Good also replaces the bureaucrat-bashing of Common
Sense with lawyer and plaintiff bashing. But while bureaucrat-bashing seems
justified (based both on the content of Common Sense and my own experience
with real world bureaucracy), the lawyer and plaintiff bashing of Common
Good is based on much less convincing evidence and seems less balanced in its
appraisal and advocacy. Notwithstanding what I regard as the comparative
deficiencies of Common Good, it does provide some law reform suggestions
worth considering, which have now become part of the organizational agenda
of Common Good.
What is perhaps most interesting about Common Sense and Common
Good is not their relative merits or that I liked one more than the other. Rather,
it is their divergence from one another and their reflection of the differences
and arguable contradictions in Howard's own thinking about law reform - and
the thought processes of all of us. In a sense, juxtaposing the two books is a
microcosm of the inherent tensions involved when constructing legal and regulatory systems. Because these tensions are so pervasive, designing and implementing effective law reform is difficult, even without interest groups, politics,
or social conflicts.
For the moment, both Howard and the body politic appear to have pivoted
toward a more formal, rule-bound system as the preferred solution to the perceived serious social and economic problems of law. Consider many of the
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modem solutions to the alleged "tort crisis": damage caps, elimination of joint
liability, restrictions on punitive damages, restrictions on noneconomic damages, restrictions on counsel fees, increased procedural and evidentiary barriers,
and so on. The United States Supreme Court's State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell8 decision provides a baleful example in which the

Court attempts to control a perceived punitive damage problem by imposing
broad and rather draconian (at least by historical standards) restrictions on such
awards.

Although the problem of tort liability amounts and consistency among
them is serious and deserves attention, was the formalist condemnation of State
Farm v. Campbell the right solution? Obviously, I think not, as do others.82 In
general, a mixture of rules and discretion best serves an adjudicatory system.8 3
Litigation and business conduct can be shaped for the better without inflexible
imposition of paint-by-numbers standards.
VII.

THE ROAD

TO WELLVILLE: SUGGESTIONS FOR EVALUATING TORT
REFORM PROPOSALS

Evaluating tort reform initiatives requires carving a path that acknowledges the long-standing and ongoing tension rules and standards, rigidity and
discretion, formalism and functionalism. Embracing formalism may seem like
a quick fix, but it is not good policy. In the long run, it may also lead to
backlash against the proponents of formalist, self-interested fixes as well as
producing unanticipated pathologies stemming from new changes. To begin to
address tort reform proposals rationally, decisionmakers need to acknowledge
these chronic tensions in the law rather than pretending that elevating formalism above functionalism will solve all of our tort and litigation problems. In
addition, a number of other considerations should be addressed during the
course of evaluating any tort reform proposal.
A. Consider Objectives Rather than Rules; Count the Gains and Costs of
Agency
Related to the problem of form versus function and rules versus discretion
is the issue of agent constraint and agent discretion. On the one hand, constraining an agent reduces the risk of loss due to unfaithful or incompetent
agents. For example, if you don't give your agent the key to the car, he can't
steal your car. But on the other hand, the agent is also unable to use the car to
respond to an emergency or seize a business opportunity.
81

538 U.S. 408 (2003); see supra note 9, summarizing the State Farm case.

82 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 432 (remarks of former Arizona Supreme Court Justice

Stanley Feldman) (labeling State Farm the "worst" U.S. Supreme Court decision he ever
read).
83 It appears I have the support of at least one area newspaper on this point. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Scales of Justice Tip Wrong Way, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 23, 2003, at 14A (in
criticizing the medical malpractice proposal of damage caps, the editorial states that by further limiting the discretion of judges and juries, the Nevada Senate action supporting the cap
legislation could prevent many victims of medical malpractice from receiving just
compensation).
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If one thinks of judges and juries as agents of society, we can see the
potential dilemma presented by many rule-based tort reform proposals. Such
proposals may be effective in preventing a "runaway jury" or an addled or
corrupt judge from going too far astray. But in addition to being imperfect
(really dumb or corrupt agents will impose costs no matter what the rules), such
rules impose the cost of preventing the agent from exercising discretion in ways
that are beneficial to society. After State Farm, juries are less likely to render
an unfoundedly high punitive damages award, but they are also less likely to be
able to render an award that will change bad corporate behavior or eliminate a
destructive company. Capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases prevents absurdly high pain and suffering verdicts. But, it also prevents
neutral parties from awarding a fair market valuation of the loss and providing
an incentive for medical providers to treat children and the less affluent with
the same care afforded to high income patients.
B.

Identify the Type of Tort Reform Argument at Issue to Sharpen Analysis

Tort reform lobbying has essentially made four categories of claims: (a)
many claims against
(fill in the blank with the name of the
interest group making the argument) are frivolous and should be prohibited or
more frequently truncated during the early stages of a dispute; (b) tort claims
for (fill in the blank again) systematically overcompensate plaintiffs;
(c) adjudication, juries in particular, do not understand complex issues like
(e.g., home construction or medical malpractice); and (d) even if
many individual claims have merit, society simply cannot afford to make many
large or erratically-sized awards to these claimants without incurring aggregate
and collateral costs that are worse than undercompensation of individual
victims.
The first argument recalls the discussion in Part I of the different factual
worlds of tort reform proponents and opponents. As discussed in Part I, knowledge in this area is largely insufficient to support sweeping tort reform proposals. On the whole, however, it appears that complaints of this type are greatly
exaggerated and that most claims have merit. Those claims that do not have
merit appear not to be moving very far into the system.84 To the extent there is
some merit in this allegation, however, the means of addressing the problem
appear to be case-specific through adjudication rather than through sweeping
systemic reforms.
The second argument also appears to be incorrect, at least for compensatory damages. Whether pre-State Farm punitive damages are too high or too
frequent returns us to the legal/political divide where personal preferences
predominate over empirical fact.
The third argument, that the dispute resolution system is incompetent or
too costly in dealing with certain claims, may have merit and may justify
targeted efforts to improve expertise and lower costs, as discussed in Part VII.F
below.
84 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 388 (remarks of Scott Canepa) (nearly all construction

defect claims tried to verdict in Nevada have been successful).
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The fourth argument, that tort reform is necessary to avoid bogging down
the economy, is addressed in Part VII.C below.
C.

Consider the Tradeoff: Individual Fairness vs. Aggregate Efficiency

Arguing against individual compensation because of its aggregate economic drain is a utilitarian position, one generally identified with John Stuart
Mill and teleologic philosophy rather than the ethical imperatives of Immanual
Kant and deontology.8 5 The slogan of utilitarians might be termed "the greatest good for society" or the "greatest good for the greatest number." The rallying cry of Kantians might be described as "treat each individual fairly and
ethically" (although this arguably begs the question, as utilitarians think they
are being perfectly ethical).
In order to reach a position on this sort of argument, one needs to have at
least a rough position on the underlying philosophical debate, or at least a reasonably principled and coherent means of determining the circumstances under
which one finds the utilitarian perspective more persuasive than the Kantian
approach (or vice versa). For example, if you are strongly and uniformly utilitarian, the issue seems like a no-brainer: limit individual claimant relief in order
to lower medical or construction costs across the board (including presumably
lower costs for the individual). Heck, why not bar individual claims altogether.
On the other hand, if you are resolutely Kantian, the easy answer is to do
whatever is necessary in the individual case in order to ensure that the victim is
adequately compensated, no matter how much this costs society as a whole.
If you are like most people who favor some fusion of these potentially
extreme positions, deciding where you stand is more difficult and probably
turns on facts we do not yet know. If we limit claims in X manner, how many
claimants will be undercompensated? By how much? What will the rest of
society save by this? How much does that translate into for my housing, medical, or insurance costs? In addition, what is it worth to me to pay X dollars
more for housing or medical care in order to have greater assurance if my home
collapses or my medical care providers cause me serious, permanent injury?
When people ask these questions, most of the time they prefer reasonably broad
individual protections or rights to compensation (in order to protect them from
mishap), but with sufficient controls so that the basic things one buys, which
generally work ninety-odd percent of the time, will not be prohibitively
expensive.
The utilitarian argument can be very persuasive: nothing is free; everything has tradeoffs. Large damage awards and counsel fees can produce poorer
housing or health care for the many. As Judge Guido Calabresi once observed,
"treating justice as a pearl beyond price carries a price of its own." 86
But this does not mean that every utilitarian gain (or prospect of gain) is
one society would embrace. Let's use damage caps as an example. Imagine a
85 Mill is one of the most widely known teleological or utilitarian philosophers, advocating

the aggregate net good of society as the highest value in ethics. Deontological philosophers
like Immanuel Kant advocate comportment with moral rules irrespective of the overall effect
of adherence to these rules. See KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 69, at 6-10.
86 Guido Calabresi, quoted in E. Donald Elliot, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 306, 321 (1986).
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twenty-five year-old victim of medical malpractice rendered quadriplegic during surgery or an athlete who becomes blind during what should have been a
routine wisdom tooth extraction. I have seen a real person who suffered this
latter fate, regularly attending the games of the University of Iowa basketball
team on which he used to play. Although he was obviously getting around, had
friends, and seemed healthy, his life was clearly altered for the worse by what
certainly appeared to my untrained mind as dental malpractice.
Even after crunching the numbers of economic loss (which may have been
low; I have no idea how blindness did or did not change this person's economic
future), what is the fair valuation to place on losing one's sight at age twenty
and going from star athlete to aural spectator? Is it more than $350,000? I
think so. I am also pretty sure most juries and judges would think so. But
under current Nevada medical malpractice law, $350,000 would be the maximum award for this sort of noneconomic loss. That situation can not pass the
Kantian test of fairness, although it might satisfy a utilitarian test if the damage
cap sufficiently reduced the costs of health insurance, dental malpractice insurance, or the ordinary price of a wisdom tooth extraction. If one is neither pure
Kantian or pure utilitarian, what is the right position? For me it would depend
on the aggregate cost of full compensation. If permitting full compensation to
this sort of victim increases the cost of tooth extraction by a modest amount
(say up to $100 for the sake of argument, although I would probably go higher),
I am willing to pay it. I may be more out-of-pocket for my next tooth extraction, but I would rather (a) feel like I live in a society where victims are not
short-changed (which gives me more than $100 of satisfaction), and (b) know
that if something similar happens to me, I will be fairly compensated. As to
(b), this just means I am willing to pay a real or de facto insurance premium of
at least $100 in return for being free of a noneconomic damages cap if something bad happens to me or a loved one.
Of course, this kind of analysis is a lot messier and harder to apply in real
life. What about other goods and services? What time frames are we talking
about? How are these extra costs imposed and administered? And don't forget
the obvious tort reform rejoinder: there is no guarantee that the legal system
will correctly adjudicate this type of dispute. I may be zeroed-out because the
jury likes Dentist X or her lawyer better than me or my lawyer. Or the injury
may not have been any fault of Dentist X, but she will be saddled with an
adverse judgment nonetheless. These are good arguments for considering
reforms in the methods of adjudication in order to seek more accuracy and
reliability, but they are not very good arguments for damage caps. Whether the
fact-finding adjudicative system is good or bad, I am still happier without caps.
Of course, others may disagree and my own views may change depending
on the facts. According to behavioral scientists, they will change according to
the way the question is framed. But my point is not to definitively resolve the
Kantian vs. utilitarian debate. Rather, my point is that the debate must be had,
substantively and rationally, if society is to make good decisions about various
tort reform proposals.
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D. Economic Analysis vs. Social Analysis
A variant of the Mill vs. Kant - individual vs. aggregate - argument is one
framing the question as one of wealth maximization vs. individual justice. To
follow through on the last example, a damage cap may, in the aggregate, lower
the social costs of a good or service previously subject to engendering litigation
and tort liability. If this aggregate savings exceeds the undercompensation of
victims, there has been a net gain in society's wealth (at least as measured in
dollars) but at the cost of some amount of individual injustice due to
undercompensation.
Under such circumstances, is the effect of the damage cap good or bad?
An economist using wealth maximization as his yardstick for social well-being
would approve. But others might consider the cost of substantial individual
undercompensation too great to justify the cap, even if there is a net savings for
the populace as a whole. Policymakers and voters facing tort reform initiatives
need to determine their position on issues of this type if they are to make
rational decisions to embrace or reject tort reform proposals.
E.

Try to Count All the Costs and Benefits

To perhaps state the obvious, making the types of balanced assessments
discussed in the preceding subsections requires decisionmakers to be wellinformed as to the real, total, nonspeculative costs and benefits of various tort
reform proposals. Only a pure Kantian would be uninterested in netting out
costs and benefits with at least some confidence. This, of course, requires
examination of tort reform to move beyond anecdote or case study (although
these can be instructive as well as rhetorically persuasive) and assemble some
reasonably reliable cost-benefit data.
Gaining this sort of information takes both time and effort. Unfortunately,
the current political climate of tort reform provides little opportunity for such
fact-gathering and thorough analysis. Instead, legislators and voters are treated
to full-court press by interest groups that are long on marketing and short on
analysis. One can only hope that more reflective sentiments will prevail over
ideology, economic interest, mindless professional allegiances and phobias, and
sloganeering.
F. Start from the Original Position and Gain Insight Through a Veil of
Ignorance
As in so many areas of law, a more modern philosopher than Kant or Mill
has valuable insights that can help clarify the way tort reform proposals are
evaluated. The late John Rawls, most famously in his celebrated book A Theory of Justice, introduced the concept of the "original position" and the "veil
of ignorance" as means of evaluating public policy. Simply put, the Rawls
approach asks the person evaluating the policy, proposal, or prospective law to
assume he or she has no idea whether he or she will be a lawyer, a doctor, a
plaintiff, a defendant, an insurer, or a person who is rich, poor, politically87 See JOHN

RAWLS,

A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1970). On the influence of Rawls on legal

thought, see Anthony Simon Laden, The House that Jack Built: Thirty Years of Reading
Rawls, 113 ETHICS 367 (2003).

Winter 2003/2004]

NOT-SO-PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

connected, politically powerless, socially elite, socially ostracized, or anything
else. Given that the person operating behind this veil of ignorance can be any
member of society, the evaluator's task is to decide whether the policy proposal
is one to enact irrespective of one's position in society. The Rawls approach
asks that policymakers decide on the shape of the legal system (and everything
else for that matter) without regard to their potential gain or loss as participants.
What does this suggest for the current tort reform debate? Despite its
imperfections, a system much like American litigation has considerable appeal
for those operating in the original position behind a veil of ignorance. If you
are a patient or a homeowner, you would have certain legal rights: a neutral,
relatively corruption-free and independent forum to hear the case; a chance to
gather information (with the help of the court where necessary to overcome the
recalcitrance of opponents); and you could obtain substantial monetary or equitable relief. If you are a builder or physician, you would have a system that
provides similar access to information, a neutral forum, due process of law
protections, and a right of appellate review.
While it would be nice to have a system that is faster and cheaper, would
you make these concessions without knowing whether you are going to be the
home buyer or the home builder involved in disputes under this system? Once
you get out from behind Rawls's veil of ignorance, self-interest would kick in
and distort judgment.
For example, if you know that you are a builder or insurer, you know that
you are likely to be the defendant (or representing the defendant) most of the
time in litigation and that you will be a so-called "repeat player" involved in a
significant number of cases. As a result, your self-interest may prompt you to
prefer a system that errs more often but is faster or cheaper in bulk, based on
the assumption that the law of averages will even things out and you will be
money ahead overall. As a builder or insurer, you will certainly be a fan of
anything that reduces, delays, or discourages recovery by homeowners. A litigation penny saved is a profitable dollar earned.
Those who know they will participate in the system as homeowners will,
of course, feel differently. They know (or at least expect and hope) that they
may be in a construction defect lawsuit only once (and in a matter that involves
their most valuable possession). Rational homeowners would rather incur
some additional disputing costs to have a system that places a premium on
accuracy and full relief.
As the old adage cautions: where you stand depends on where you sit.
One promising way to try to wring some self-interest out of the system is to
adopt the Rawls approach. Although critics argue that this approach is slanted
toward liberalism and more government,88 I see it as a simple thought experiment that can bring policy analysis closer to neutrality, something that could be
useful in the tort reform debate.
Some tort reform proposals might perform quite well under the Rawls test.
Consider abolition of the collateral source rule, so that the jury knows whether
a tort claimant has insurance or other sources of compensation for the injury
that is the subject of the lawsuit. Typically, defendants love the collateral
88 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
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source rule and plaintiffs hate it, for obvious but self-interested reasons. But
even for a badly injured plaintiff it is hard to advocate double recovery. In
many cases, the law prohibits or inhibits double recovery outright by allowing
collateral providers of compensation (e.g., workers compensation insurers) to
obtain reimbursement from a successful plaintiff.
Expert juries or specialized courts are another law reform notion that
appears to do well under the Rawls construct. Although there is the possibility
that experts could be "captured" by an interest group, prejudiced by socialization within their field of expertise, or jaded to the complaint of laypersons, it is
probably more likely that they would better understand complex issues and be
able to adjudicate them faster and cheaper than lay judges, juries, or
arbitrators. 89
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) of almost any mainstream kind, so
long as conducted fairly and with sufficient data, also appears to score well in a
Rawls regime. Medical malpractice screening panels, once the norm in
Nevada, appears not to have many fans but would hold some attraction when
viewed from the original position. There is always a risk, however, that adding
layers of ADR will really only add additional procedural hurdles, a development that would hinder claimants and help defendants.
Many other potential law reform/tort reform initiatives would seemingly
get serious attention when viewed through the Rawls prism, even though they
are not being aggressively pushed by tort reformers. Examples are: more government oversight of professionals and businesses; a more comprehensive, professional, and government-operated system of ADR, including short trials or
mini-trials; use of a broader social welfare system of compensating injury,
funded by taxation of the industry causing injury. Yes, I know businesses
would yelp, but if the litigation system is as bad as asserted by some businesses, one would think this change would be less expensive for business and
industry as a whole. Perhaps a larger social welfare safety net along the European or Canadian models is the most direct way to address certain social
problems. In addition, government-supported insurance or government support
for the formation of captive insurance companies by professionals also seems
to offer hope. At least we could determine how much of the tort reform problem is an insurance problem as opposed to a liability or litigation problem.
In making these suggestions, I am not only endorsing some incorporation
of Rawls concepts in tort reform analysis, but am also suggesting a generally
more reflective and analytical approach to tort reform and law reform. Much of
the current tort reform discussion is extremely light on comprehensive analysis.
Rather, interest groups stake out their positions and politicians engineer
whatever compromise can be achieved. Failing that, the better organized and
more powerful interest groups forge ahead, usually obtaining at least partial
success.
89 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67 (1995)

(generally endorsing further experimentation with specialized courts in certain areas, but
cautioning that appellate courts should remain generalist as a check on the danger of insularity). See also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts
in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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Notwithstanding the generally grim tort reform scene, some groups have
made suggestions well worth considering. Although I have been critical of
"Keep Our Doctors in Nevada" and some of its agenda of greater immunity for
doctors, portions of the doctors' political agenda deserve support, including:
"any willing provider" laws; mandated occurrence-based insurance, which generally provides more protection to policyholders than the claims-made policies
historically used in medical malpractice and also eliminates the doctor's need
to purchase "tail" coverage after the expiration of the claims-made policy;
Department of Insurance penalties for malpractice insurers who continue to
insure problem physicians; state requirements for fair rates of insurer reimbursement to physicians and limitations on an insurer's ability to approve payment, reverse field, and then set this amount off against other funds owed to the
doctor. 90
Similarly, many of the Common Good proposals outlined by Nancy
Udell9" deserve serious consideration, including: replacement of litigation with
a more administrative approach; increased expertise of decisionmakers; greater
impartiality of expert witnesses; use of standard of care and risk management
protocols as an affirmative defense by doctors; organization incentives for quality improvement; reduced adversarialism and more ADR. 9 2 Although I am
opposed to rigid caps on noneconomic damages (or any type of damage for that
matter), Common Good's suggestion of damage schedules to set damage
parameters for the exercise of judicial discretion has promise.
Similarly, although contingent fee regulation should not reduce patient
access to justice or strangle the plaintiff's bar necessary for effective enforcement of the law, some limitations on contingent fees may be in order (a move
supported both by Common Good and "Keep Our Doctors in Nevada"). A fifty
percent contingency fee makes sense as to the first dollars of a recovery in light
of the risks and expenses incurred by plaintiff's counsel, who may well invest
thousands of hours in a case and come up empty. But where plaintiff obtains a
large award (which also, of course, implies serious injury), should the lawyer
continue to get a fifty percent cut on the second million? The third million?
The fourth million?
See Irwin Simon, Medical Malpractice Legislation, COMMUNIQUE, Aug. 2003, at 30, 32
(describing these doctor objectives). In addition Simon notes that "one popular physician
alternative" is to allow doctors to "go bare" and refuse to purchase malpractice insurance,
notifying patients that they are uninsured. I have reservations about this item of the doctor
agenda, although it at least bears examination. Lawyers should be hesitant to criticize this
approach because legal malpractice insurance is not required in Nevada. As between these
professions, one can make a good case that sauce for the goose should be sauce for the
gander. But if doctors, like lawyers, are permitted to go bare, they should be prohibited from
taking certain actions to make themselves "judgment proof." With professional status and
professional financial reward come professional responsibility. Although reasonable asset
protection (e.g., owning one's homestead outright) should not be forbidden, many of the
more exotic means of shielding assets are inconsistent with professional responsibility and
should be forbidden for uninsured doctors and lawyers.
91 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 409-411 (remarks of Nancy Udell).
92 See generally COMMON GOOD, ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF MEDICAL JUSTICE (2003) (outlining suggestions and collecting sources). Materials are available on the Common Good
website at http://cgood.org.
90
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A seemingly radical proposal made at the Symposium is also worth pursuing: eliminate individual physician liability and instead impose liability on hospitals, clinics, or HMOs. This type of respondeat superior mechanism should
increase quality control efforts of medical providers and provide a boost toward
weeding out problematic physicians or staff, as well as holding some 93
hope for
leveling the bargaining field between medical providers and insurers.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

With perhaps some rhetorical excess, I have analogized the current tort
reform situation to the Cold War and the adaptation of peaceful coexistence
that, despite being the butt of humor, served to keep the war "cold" rather than
"hot." Of course the analogy is imperfect. Fortunately, the tort reform mess
need not be as adversarial and polarized as international political conflict. And
even the real Cold War came to an end (although international conflict
remains). But advancement on this domestic front will require more sustained
cerebral efforts by professionals and policymakers and less opportunistic
electioneering.

93 See Symposium, supra note 1, at 413 (remarks of Professor Ann McGinley).

